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I. INTRODUCTION 
There was a particular five day period when one could see that 
values had died in American law.1 Those five days were June 24 to June 
 
*Professor of Law and Associate Dean of Academic Affairs, Duquesne University School of Law. 
This paper was prepared with support from the Duquesne Law School Summer Research Writing 
Program. 
 1.  There is an ambiguity in the title of this Article that I could not overcome. Despite the 
title, I don’t mean that values died in American Law in June 1992, only that the death of values that 
had already occurred became fully manifest during this five day period. As to when the death of 
values actually occurred, I can only say sometime between the highly normative opinions in Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) and the five 
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29, 1992. During those five days, the United States Supreme Court 
decided Lee v. Weisman2 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.3 Every 
Justice on the Court joined either Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Lee or Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in Casey.4 In these 
two opinions, all of the Justices ultimately agreed that normative 
judgments are just human constructions. Future Justices of the Supreme 
Court thereafter abdicated authority to set objective standards over a 
wide range of issues, ultimately resulting in a regime of constitutional 
law dominated by what I call here the death of values in American Law. 
Isn’t this surprising? Avant garde law professors and postmodern 
thinkers may make arguments about the non-foundational nature of 
reality. But do we expect Supreme Court Justices to talk this way? 
Consider the statement by the late Richard Rorty that “non-theists 
make better citizens of democratic societies than theists” because non-
theists believe “that agreement among human beings is the source of all 
norms.”5 Are we then to consider all nine Justices on the United States 
Supreme Court to be functional atheists as of June 1992? If so, have we 
law professors told this to our students? Have we acknowledged, in the 
classroom, the arrival of nihilism? 
These judicial statements are emblematic of where American law 
and society stand today. Once the reality of nihilism is acknowledged, its 
presence can be widely seen. The rest of this Article sets a wide frame to 
do that. Part II of this Article provides the setting and the cases giving 
rise to the death of values. Part III of this Article describes how the death 
of values manifests in American culture generally and among law 
 
days in June 1992 that I reference in this Article. Brown and Bolling reflected a strong, self-
confident, postwar American commitment to the good. Even the noted legal positivist, Robert Bork, 
referred to Brown as “the greatest moral achievement of our constitutional law” in his opening 
statement at the confirmation hearing for his nomination to the Supreme Court. See Bork 
Confirmation Battle, CQPRESS 722 (April 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.cqpress.com/incontext/SupremeCourt/bork_confirmation.htm. And Bolling, which 
applied Equal Protection principles to Congressional racial segregation action without any 
justification in Constitutional text or history, rested entirely upon the Court’s moral intuition: “In 
view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated 
public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on 
the Federal Government.” 347 U.S. at 500.  
 2.  505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 3.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). It was Justice Scalia in 
dissent in Casey who used the phrase “five days” in referring to Casey and Lee and the 
jurisprudential implications of the two cases, thus leading me to use that image and that lens through 
which to examine American law. See excerpt from Casey, infra Part II. 
 4.  Technically, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part.  
 5.  Springs et al, Pragmatism and Democracy: Assessing Stout’s Democracy and Tradition, 
78 J. AM. ACAD. RELIG. 413, 419-20 (2010). 
2
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professors. Part IV of the Article reflects the death of values in the 
pattern of normative interpretation of rights in constitutional law. Part V 
does the same with regard to the law of religious exemptions. In Parts VI 
and VII, I examine how law copes with the death of values and the 
darker implications of such coping strategies. Finally, Part VIII 
identifies the death of values as a key component of the decline, 
numerical and otherwise, in American law schools. 
This wide-ranging Article is an acknowledgment of nihilism, not a 
criticism. It was inevitable that even the heart of law would embrace the 
subjectivity of values. So, I am not putting forward a theory of objective 
values with which to confront the Justices. That is not needed or even 
possible. 
What is shocking is not that we have fallen into nihilism, but that 
we accept our plight without qualm or worry. Therefore, what is needed 
jurisprudentially is a new start in which the weight of the death of values 
is felt. That much we owe to Nietzsche, who felt that weight. As Martin 
Heidegger teaches us, “What is most inescapable and most difficult in 
this overcoming [of nihilism] is the knowledge of nihilism.”6 
II. THE SETTING AND THE CASES 
The first statement of the death of values in these cases was Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman,7 handed down 
on June 24, 1992. The majority opinion was joined by Justices 
Blackmun, Stevens, O’Connor, and Souter. The majority struck down 
graduation prayers at public schools. 
There are two major themes in Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion—the coercion said to be present because of the importance of 
graduation in the life of the student and the involvement of the public 
school officials in giving a pamphlet to Rabbi Leslie Gutterman for the 
preparation of nonsectarian prayer. 
The school officials argued that a nonsectarian prayer—one that 
would be “acceptable to most persons”8—should be constitutional 
because, unlike a prayer identifiable with a particular religion—a 
reference to Jesus Christ, for example—a nonsectarian prayer would not 
create problems of religious division. But Justice Kennedy found that the 
very effort to encourage nonsectarianism involved the government in the 
 
 6.  MARTIN HEIDEGGER, CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY (OF THE EVENT), 110 (Richard 
Rojcewicz & Daniela Vallega-Neu trans., 2012). 
 7.  505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 8.  Id. at 589. 
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forbidden activity of writing prayers.9 
Of more concern to us here than the holding is the meaning that 
Justice Kennedy associated with nonsectarian prayers. Such prayers 
could not be the work of government because they would assert the 
reality of moral and ethical values: 
We are asked to recognize the existence of a practice of nonsectarian 
prayer, prayer within the embrace of what is known as the Judeo-
Christian tradition, prayer which is more acceptable than one which, 
for example, makes explicit references to the God of Israel, or to Jesus 
Christ, or to a patron saint. There may be some support, as an empiri-
cal observation . . . that there has emerged in this country a civic reli-
gion, one which is tolerated when sectarian exercises are not. If com-
mon ground can be defined which permits once conflicting faiths to 
express the shared conviction that there is an ethic and a morality 
which transcend human invention, the sense of community and pur-
pose sought by all decent societies might be advanced. But though the 
First Amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers 
which aspire to these ends, neither does it permit the government to 
undertake that task for itself.10 
This passage had nothing to do with the particular prayers offered 
by Rabbi Gutterman at the graduation in question. Those prayers raised 
no clearly moral claims.11 Rather, this passage views the claim that 
 
 9.  Id. at 588.  
 10.  Id.  
 11.  These were the actual prayers: 
INVOCATION 
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: For the legacy of America where diversity is cele-
brated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men 
and women grow up to enrich it. For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these 
new graduates grow up to guard it. For the political process of America in which all its 
citizens may participate, for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. 
May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust. For the destiny of America 
we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they 
might help to share it. May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, 
who are our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled. AMEN  
BENEDICTION 
O God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for learning 
which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement. Happy families give thanks for 
seeing their children achieve an important milestone. Send Your blessings upon the 
teachers and administrators who helped prepare them. The graduates now need strength 
and guidance for the future, help them to understand that we are not complete with aca-
demic knowledge alone. We must each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do 
justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly. We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us 
alive, sustaining us and allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion. AMEN. 
Lee, 505 U.S. at 581-82. 
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morality transcends human choice as religious in nature, thus raising 
concerns about the establishment of religion. 
This is the death of values in American law. If religion involves 
claims about the independence of morality from the opinions of human 
beings—an activity government may not “undertake”—then secular 
instruments like law must not involve claims of moral objectivity. A law 
like ours, which is necessarily based on secular sources, cannot make the 
claim that values “transcend[] human invention.” 
Actually, I am overstating Justice Kennedy’s commitment to the 
objectivity of values even in the religious traditions. According to 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lee, nonsectarian prayer only expresses 
“the shared conviction” that there is objective morality. Nonsectarian 
prayer only “aspires[s]” to be that expression. In the view of the majority 
in Lee, morality consists of claims that humans make that are not 
resolvable by any method but some form of human choice. 
The same view of moral claims animates Justice Scalia’s dissent in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, issued five days after Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion in Lee, on June 29, 1992. The context in Casey was the 
political pressure the Supreme Court was experiencing as public 
demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns were staged to influence 
the Justices’ decision to uphold or strike down Roe v. Wade.12 
A number of the Justices were apparently upset by these public 
political activities. But Justice Scalia went beyond criticizing these 
political tactics as inappropriate. In his dissent, Justice Scalia laid the 
blame for these political expressions at the feet of the majority of the 
Justices, who were upholding the right to choose abortion in Casey. He 
attributed the political pressure to the failure of these Justices to limit 
their analysis of the abortion issue to purely legal materials and methods: 
What makes all this relevant to the bothersome application of “political 
pressure” against the Court are the twin facts that the American people 
love democracy and the American people are not fools. As long as this 
Court thought (and the people thought) that we Justices were doing es-
sentially lawyers’ work up here—reading text and discerning our soci-
ety’s traditional understanding of that text—the public pretty much left 
us alone. Texts and traditions are facts to study, not convictions to 
demonstrate about. But if in reality our process of constitutional adju-
dication consists primarily of making value judgments; if we can ig-
nore a long and clear tradition clarifying an ambiguous text, as we did, 
for example, five days ago in declaring unconstitutional invocations 
 
 12.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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and benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies, Lee v. 
Weisman . . . if, as I say, our pronouncement of constitutional law rests 
primarily on value judgments, then a free and intelligent people’s atti-
tude towards us can be expected to be (ought to be) quite different. The 
people know that their value judgments are quite as good as those 
taught in any law school—maybe better. If, indeed, the “liberties” pro-
tected by the Constitution are, as the Court says, undefined and un-
bounded, then the people should demonstrate, to protest that we do not 
implement their values instead of ours. Not only that, but confirmation 
hearings for new Justices should deteriorate into question-and-answer 
sessions in which Senators go through a list of their constituents’ most 
favored and most disfavored alleged constitutional rights, and seek the 
nominee’s commitment to support or oppose them. Value judgments, 
after all, should be voted on, not dictated; and if our Constitution has 
somehow accidently committed them to the Supreme Court, at least we 
can have a sort of plebiscite each time a new nominee to that body is 
put forward.13 
To paraphrase Justice Scalia, only if lawyers’ work is technical and 
objective will people turn to lawyers to do it. If the people knew that 
legal interpretations are just value judgments, they would want to make 
those judgments for themselves. 
“Value judgments” are what you have if you are not doing lawyers’ 
work, that is, if you do not have objective standards of some kind. 
Objective standards for Justice Scalia are things that can be counted and 
measured—”facts” that have some kind of physical reality—like the 
number of repetitions of high school graduation prayers throughout 
American history or the number of states that prohibited abortion before 
the Supreme Court decided Roe. 
Even though they disagreed about the outcome in these two cases, 
Justices Kennedy and Scalia did not disagree about ontology—that is, 
they did not disagree about what is real. Claims of right and wrong, good 
and bad, true and false, and beautiful and ugly are matters of human 
opinion. Since Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas 
joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in Casey, all nine Justices joined one or 
the other of these opinions in June 1992, expressing a skeptical view of 
moral reality. 
Now let us turn to the opposite sides of each of these opinions to 
see whether values were still living there. Values do not live in the 
dissent in Lee. That dissent, also by Justice Scalia, was joined by Chief 
 
 13.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000-01 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting in part). 
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Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, as his Casey dissent 
would be five days later. Justice Scalia in his Lee dissent emphasized 
that “the Establishment Clause must be construed in light of 
‘[g]overnment policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and 
support for religion [that] are an accepted part of our political and 
cultural heritage’ [and] ‘the meaning of the Clause is to be determined 
by reference to historical practices and understandings.’”14 
Justice Scalia then directly contrasted his emphasis on history with 
what he called the majority’s philosophy: “Today’s opinion shows more 
forcefully than volumes of argumentation why our Nation’s protection, 
that fortress which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the 
changeable philosophical predilections of the Justices of this Court, but 
must have deep foundations in the historic practices of our people.”15 
The term “philosophical predilections” here functions the same way that 
the phrase “value judgments” does in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Casey. 
Justice Scalia alleges that the value judgments of the majority in each 
case constitute subjectivism. But, then, why is not Justice Scalia’s 
commitment to historical practices also a mere value judgment or 
philosophical predilection? The acid of nihilism eats away everything. 
In contrast to Lee, there was no total majority opinion in Casey, 
opposite Justice Scalia’s dissent. But the crucial passage in the lead 
opinion in Casey for purposes of confronting Justice Scalia’s view of 
value judgments, did represent the majority view of Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy, Souter, Stevens, and Blackmun. This passage in the lead 
opinion, however, did not contest the subjective aspect of value choice 
but instead radically enhanced the claim of subjectivism. 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of exist-
ence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of person-
hood were they formed under compulsion of the State.16 
Value judgments are thus entirely subjective and personal for a 
majority of the Justices in Casey. Like appeals to historical practices to 
interpret the Constitution, this hyper individualism functions to avoid all 
claims of truth. There is, instead of truth, “one’s own concept.” But, in 
contrast to the language cited above, there was a point in the lead 
opinion in Casey, a point at which it was joined by Justices Stevens and 
Blackmun, in which something like a claim to truth was made. This part 
 
 14.  Lee, 505 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 15.  Id. at 632. 
 16.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
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of the opinion discussed the concept of stare decisis, the doctrine 
concerning overruling past decisions, on the way to upholding most of 
the right to abortion first announced in Roe. A majority of Justices stated 
that sometimes the Supreme Court is justified in overruling a past case 
but claimed that such reasons did not apply to Roe. 
A majority of Justices in Casey described one of the celebrated 
examples of justified overruling of a case—Brown v. Board of 
Education,17 which overruled Plessy v. Ferguson.18 Brown was premised 
on a new understanding of the facts concerning the social meaning and 
effect of separate but equal treatment based on race. By 1954, it was 
understood that segregation was a badge of inferiority, which the 
majority in Plessy had denied. But a majority of Justices in Casey were 
not content with this explanation because it would have suggested that 
perhaps the Plessy Court had made only a kind of empirical mistake in 
upholding racial segregation in 1896. So, citing the famous dissent by 
Justice John Marshall Harlan in Plessy, the majority also wrote that “we 
think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided.”19 
What did this assertion mean? In his dissent in Plessy, Justice 
Harlan had contested the facts. He wrote that “[e]very one knows” that 
the purpose of segregation was to keep blacks away from whites and not 
the other way around.20 There was nothing equal about separate but 
equal. 
But Justice Harlan also wrote that “[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind,”21 and called the majority decision “the wrong this day done,”22 
thus suggesting that the dispute in question was far deeper than any 
sociological disagreement. His dissent amounted to a moral 
condemnation of government imposed segregation. When Plessy was 
finally overruled, the Court in Brown declared that “[s]eparate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal,”23 and it is that sense of the 
injustice of government distributing benefits based on race that rendered 
Plessy wrong from the beginning.24 
 
 17.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 18.  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 19.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 863. 
 20.  163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 21.  Id. at 559. 
 22.  Id. at 562. 
 23.  Brown v. Bd. of Ed. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 24.  Justice Harlan denied that the “injustice” of segregation necessarily rendered it 
unconstitutional, (“However apparent the injustice of such legislation may be, we have only to 
consider whether it is consistent with the constitution of the United States.”), but it is difficult to 
read his dissent, with its final condemnation of the wrong done by the majority, and take this 
declaration seriously. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553. 
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Lawyers say things like “this case was wrongly decided” all the 
time, and it is not clear exactly what is meant.25 When lawyers say that, 
we don’t mean that Plessy was wrong in the sense of using the wrong 
method of interpreting the Constitution. It was not wrong, in other 
words, for any technical reason that lawyers have special expertise 
about. In fact, the outcome in Plessy was quite defensible on textual and 
historical grounds since school segregation was enacted by the same 
Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment.26 
Plessy was wrong the day it was decided because the system of 
racial apartheid that it permitted was unjust. Plessy was morally wrong. 
Because it was morally wrong—so very morally wrong—it could never 
have been a proper interpretation of our Constitution. That is the 
meaning of the “wrong” condemned by a majority of Justices in Casey. 
But how could a majority of Justices in Casey be so sure of a moral 
commitment like that after the death of values? It would appear that this 
statement about Plessy is at odds with the view elsewhere expressed in 
the opinions discussed above that value judgments are matters of human 
construction. 
I do not believe that there is a genuine commitment here to the 
objectivity of values. What allows a value judgment about Plessy, as 
opposed to most other matters, is simply historical consensus. The 
problem with value judgments is that, because they are subjective, 
disputes about them cannot be resolved. On the other hand, if everyone 
agrees today that Plessy was morally wrong, the Justices are willing to 
say so as well—however inconsistent that may be theoretically. 
In response to the assertion by a majority of Justices in Casey about 
Plessy, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Casey, did not, of course, suggest that 
the value judgment about the wrongness of Plessy was something 
subjective or something to be voted on. He simply agreed to Plessy’s 
erroneous character without realizing—or not wishing publicly to 
consider—that Plessy could easily have been justified based on the sort 
of textualism, originalism, and tradition methods that Justice Scalia often 
serves up as interpretation.27 
 
 25.  See generally, Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and 
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 677 (2005). 
 26.  I am not criticizing recent efforts to defend Brown on originalist grounds. See Derek A. 
Webb, Note, Getting Right With Brown: How Originalist Supreme Court Nominees Defend Brown 
v. Board of Education, 9 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 563 (2011). Such a defense may well be possible. 
But Plessy is still eminently defensible within the normal parameters of originalism. 
 27.  Justice Scalia has acknowledged the problem of Brown for his originalist methodology 
and calls criticism on that basis, “waving the bloody shirt of Brown.” Margaret Talbot, Supreme 
Confidence: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 28, 2005, at 40. 
9
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So, yes, the Justices could assert with confidence that Plessy was 
wrong, but only because they were actually asserting that the American 
people believe that to be the case. Perhaps they would have liked to 
assert more. But nothing suggests that they were asserting more. 
Having shown the arrival of the death of values in law, the question 
arises whether this phenomenon is a purely legal one. Of course, it is 
not. The death of values practically defines American culture today. 
III. THE CONTEXT OF THE DEATH OF VALUES IN AMERICAN CULTURE 
AND AMONG LAW PROFESSORS 
The death of values in law is a reflection of the phenomenon that 
Nietzsche saw but could not overcome. Nietzsche’s death of God28 is not 
about a declining percentage of people attending places of organized 
religious worship. Atheism could be rampant in churchgoers too. 
Nor is atheism really the right word to describe the death of God. 
The death of God referred not just to the Supreme Being of Christianity, 
but to the metaphysical world of ideals—what people used to call the 
Good, the True, and the Beautiful. And by dead, Nietzsche was not 
taking a position about their existence, but about their potency. As 
Heidegger wrote in an essay about Nietzsche,29 the pronouncement 
“God is dead” means that this ideal world “is without effective power.”30 
We can no longer build a civilization on these foundations. And that 
means we cannot maintain one either. The right word for this is nihilism. 
In nihilism, the certainty that some things are good or true or 
beautiful died as well as God. It could no longer be assumed that one 
thing was more significant than another or, indeed, that there was any 
such thing as significance. There was no obvious answer to the question: 
Why bother? Here is how Andre Comte-Sponville describes nihilism in 
The Little Book of Atheist Spirituality: “What does nihilism mean? It 
means that the higher values have depreciated; that the ends have 
vanished; that there is no longer any answer to the question, ‘What’s the 
use?’”31 
 
 28.  Nietzsche’s famous madman scene announcing the death of God can be found at 
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 167, 181 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1974) (1877). For my 
earlier treatment of the implications of nihilism in law, see Bruce Ledewitz, Seeking ‘Common 
Ground:’ A Secular Statement, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 49, 90 (2010). 
 29.  Martin Heidegger, The Word of Nietzsche: “God is Dead” in THE QUESTION 
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 53 (William Lovitt trans., 1977). 
 30.  Id. at 61. 
 31.  Andre Comte-Sponville, THE LITTLE BOOK OF ATHEIST SPIRITUALITY 203 (Nancy 
Huston trans., 2006). 
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Once the concept of a binding norm was lost, it was no longer 
possible to assert with confidence that one action was inherently better 
than another. Of course, a means to an end could still be judged as to its 
effectiveness. But no end could be judged except as to its effectiveness 
as a means to another, equally arbitrary, end. Reason itself, therefore, 
became merely an instrument. As Charles Taylor writes in A Secular 
Age, from the perspective of this ontology, any sense that we have of an 
intrinsically higher demand, any phenomenology of universalism, must 
be some form of delusion.32 
There is real harm to people in this valueless world. The sense we 
have that it does not ultimately matter what we do is described by 
Stephen Buhner in The Lost Language of Plants as “[t]he wound that 
comes from believing we are alone amid dead uncaring nature.”33 
The death of values has become widespread in popular culture. One 
example will suffice to show the cultural spread of nihilism, an example 
from a source that can serve as a barometer of this society’s 
consciousness, especially among the educated elite. In episode 3 of the 
2014 Cosmos series, Neil deGrasse Tyson, the narrator of the series, 
asserts that before the rise of science, humans associated the arrival of 
comets with momentous events, usually bad ones. A comet, in other 
words, was a sign from some god. As Tyson put it, “They took it 
personally. Can we blame them?”34 
 Tyson was suggesting that ancient humans were mistaken. He calls 
this mistake a matter of “false pattern recognition.” And there is a reason 
for an error like this. Tyson says of human beings, “We hunger for 
significance. For signs that our personal existence is of special meaning 
to the universe. To that end, we are all too eager to deceive ourselves 
and others. To discern a sacred image in a grilled cheese sandwich.” 
 This last comment was an off-the-cuff joke at religion’s expense. 
But Tyson’s underlying claim has nothing to do with religion per se. It is 
quite clear to Tyson, as it is quite clear to many educated people, that our 
personal existence has no special significance for the universe. There is 
no ultimate sense in which who we are and what we do matters. Nor 
does anything else matter, from the cry of a child to the death of a star. It 
might matter to the child or to any intelligent beings blown up along 
 
 32.  CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 609 (2007). 
 33.  STEPHEN HARROD BUHNER, THE LOST LANGUAGE OF PLANTS: THE ECOLOGICAL 
IMPORTANCE OF PLANT MEDICINES TO LIFE ON EARTH 22 (2002). 
 34.  Cosmos: A Spacetime Odyssey: When Knowledge Conquered Fear, (Fox Network 
television broadcast Mar. 23, 2014). I took this quote, and the ones that follow, from replaying the 
Cosmos series on demand. The reader is welcome to verify the quotes.  
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with the star, but nothing matters objectively, inherently, and ultimately. 
This is another way of saying that values are subjective. 
Like the Justices in the prior section, Tyson does not always assert 
that the universe is without meaning. In the last episode of the Cosmos 
series, Tyson ends by declaring that human beings do science “because it 
matters what’s true.” Does Tyson, then, believe that truth means 
something special to the universe? Or, would he just like to believe that? 
We also learn in the last episode of the series why Tyson is so 
anxious to claim that humans are not of special significance to the 
universe.35 In that last episode, Tyson reframed Carl Sagan’s famous 
“pale blue dot” monologue from the first Cosmos series. Sagan asked 
NASA to take one last picture of Earth as the Voyager 1 spacecraft 
passed Neptune. Then, in the original Cosmos series, and repeated in the 
last episode of the new series, the viewer watches as Earth fades to what 
Sagan calls the “pale blue dot.” The following is part of Sagan’s original 
commentary, played anew, as we watch: 
Our posturings, our imagined self-importance, the delusion that we 
have some privileged position in the Universe, are challenged by this 
point of pale light. Our planet is a lonely speck in the great enveloping 
cosmic dark. In our obscurity, in all this vastness, there is no hint that 
help will come from elsewhere to save us from ourselves. 
When Sagan says humans are not special, he is hoping that human 
evil will thereby be lessened. Unfortunately, Sagan is tragically mistaken 
in this hope. Humans do not kill each other because they believe God 
loves them especially. Humans kill each other because of our fear that 
we are nothing. Nietzsche shared Sagan and Tyson’s view that we are 
not special. Sagan’s “pale blue dot” is not an antidote to nihilism. It is its 
birthplace. 
Sagan must never have read how Nietzsche also described our 
cosmic insignificance. If he had, Sagan would have experienced the 
deep, disturbing chill of nihilism. Sagan would have heard his own 
words with a far different resonance: 
In some remote corner of the universe, poured out and glittering in in-
numerable solar systems, there once was a star on which clever ani-
mals invented knowledge. That was the highest and most mendacious 
minute of ‘world history’—yet only a minute. After nature had drawn 
 
 35.  Cosmos: A Spacetime Odyssey: Unafraid of the Dark, (Fox Network television broadcast 
Jun. 8, 2014). 
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a few breaths the star grew cold, and the clever animals had to die.36 
Aside from my few examples, it is not hard to see that the death of 
values infects American life generally. Nihilism can be seen in all kinds 
of social pathologies, from the decline in marriage to the decline in 
work. New York Times columnist David Brooks calls these changes 
“declining social capital.”37 Others talk about the lack of social 
discipline. According to the popular magazine Sports Illustrated, 
“approximately 10 million American children have experienced parental 
incarceration at some point in their lives.”38 Even some sources of 
economic inequality can be seen here. At one time, there might have 
been embarrassment for a CEO in taking a large salary while the income 
of workers stagnated. Such embarrassment has lost its motivating power. 
There is one place where nihilism is especially visible and 
especially harmful. In American politics everyone can see nihilism’s 
acid at work in our partisan divisions. Despite the death of values, 
people still want things and struggle to obtain them. This leads to 
inevitable conflicts and, since there are no common norms and 
commitments through which to evaluate these conflicts and resolve them 
by pronouncing a binding judgment, political life becomes endless 
fighting. 
Yet, not everything is dark. There is another consequence of the 
death of values that does not manifest in strife. As norms have collapsed 
in America, a tolerance has grown that would have been unthinkable 
fifty years ago. This tolerance is behind the rapid acceptance of gay 
marriage, for example. It is part of the reason for the real decline in 
racism in this society. Jesus said that we should not judge,39 and young 
people today really do seem to practice that. “Whatever,” they say. 
But even this result is fundamentally just more nihilistic acid. Is 
tolerance all that gay people have a right to expect? Frederick Douglass 
once demanded on behalf of people of color, not benevolence, sympathy 
or pity, but “‘simply justice.’”40 What about justice for gay couples? 
That is the proper foundation for gay marriage rather than tolerance. 
There are voices now in the gay community that are challenging 
 
 36.  Frederich Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, 
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl201/modules/Philosophers/Nietzsche/Truth_and_Lie_in_an_Extra
-Moral_Sense.htm. 
 37.  David Brooks, The New Right, NEW YORK TIMES, June 10, 2014.  
 38.  L. Jon Wertheim, Carrying the Burden, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 29, 2014 at 66. 
 39.  Matthew 7:1. 
 40.  Quoted by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 US 306, 349-50 
(2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part).  
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tolerance as the foundation for gay rights very much along these lines, 
most notably Suzanna Walters, in her new book, The Tolerance Trap.41 
The proper response to the claim by some religious practitioners 
that homosexual love is immoral is not to say, “That is only your 
opinion.” The proper response is to say, “You are mistaken, and here is 
why.”42 This distinction is why Austin Dacey, in his book, The Secular 
Conscience, urged his fellow secularists not to abandon moral claims.43 
But, in the reign of the death of values, this is easier said than done. 
Law professors are part of this culture and also manifest its 
nihilism. We law professors in our writing and teaching bring the culture 
of nihilism into the law. 
To see the effect of the death of values among law professors, 
consider a 2008 symposium that was held at Pepperdine University to 
discuss the concept of higher law. At one time, the existence of higher 
law would have been taken for granted. It was part of the ideal world 
that Nietzsche saw had ended. At a later point in legal development, 
there would have been a debate over higher law, with positivists 
asserting that there is no such thing and advocating that law be evaluated 
according to ends that can be measured, such as economic efficiency or 
even forms of morality. But, revealingly, some of these positivists, like 
H. L. A. Hart, were careful not to deny that objective morality existed, 
whatever that might have meant to them. Hart fully defended the 
commitment that there could be a moral obligation to disobey an unjust 
law.44 
By 2008, however, the context had changed. The title of the 2008 
symposium was, “Is There a Higher Law? Does It Matter?”45 This title 
represents a new stage, in which it can credibly be asserted that even if 
higher law exists in some sense, it might not matter. Now, we cannot be 
confident that anything matters. In fact, the symposium might just as 
well have been entitled, “Does Anything Matter?” 
 
 41.  SUZANNA DANUTA WALTERS, THE TOLERANCE TRAP: HOW GOD, GENES, AND GOOD 
INTENTIONS ARE SABOTAGING GAY EQUALITY (2014). 
 42.  The Supreme Court also was unable ultimately to speak the language of morality about 
gay marriage. See the discussion of Obergefell v. Hodges, infra Part IV. 
 43.  AUSTIN DACEY, THE SECULAR CONSCIENCE: WHY BELIEF BELONGS IN PUBLIC LIFE 
(2008). 
 44.  Hart defended Austin and Bentham from the criticism that the separation of law and 
morals, which they and he propounded, would lead to general obedience to immoral law, by 
attributing to them the view that “if laws reached a certain degree of iniquity then there would be a 
plain moral obligation to resist them and to withhold obedience.” H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 617 (1958).  
 45.  See generally, Symposium: Is There A Higher Law? Does it Matter?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 
463 (2009). 
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The spirit of the death of values was caught earlier in law, by Art 
Leff, in the chilling poem with which he ended his 1979 law review 
article, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law: 
All I can say is this: it looks as if we are all we have. Given what we 
know about ourselves, and each other, this is an extraordinarily unap-
petizing prospect; looking around the world, it appears that if all men 
are brothers, the ruling model is Cain and Abel. Neither reason, nor 
love, nor even terror, seems to have worked to make us “good,” and 
worse than that, there is no reason why anything should. Only if ethics 
were something unspeakable by us could law be unnatural, and there-
fore unchallengeable. As things stand now, everything is up for grabs. 
Nevertheless: 
Napalming babies is bad. 
Starving the poor is wicked. 
Buying and selling each other is depraved. 
Those who stood up and died resisting Adolph Hitler, Joseph Stalin, 
Idi Amin, and Pol Pot—and General Custer too—have earned salva-
tion. 
Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned. 
There is in the world such a thing as evil. 
[All together now:] Sez who? 
God help us.46 
Of course, in this section, I am not describing anything unique to 
law professors. Leff’s last line—God help us—carries an uncanny echo 
to a late saying of Heidegger in his 1966 interview in the German 
newsweekly Der Spiegel—an interview I doubt Leff had read—that 
“[o]nly a god can still save us.”47 
A few years after Leff’s poem came out, in 1984, William Singer, 
on behalf of the Critical Legal Studies movement, launched his critique 
of legal theory’s claims to objectivity, rationality and neutrality in the 
shadow of nihilism, but with a great deal of hope in a pragmatic law that 
would free us to embrace “passionate moral and political 
 
 46.  Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1249 (1979). 
 47.  Der Spiegel interview with Martin Heidegger (1966), available at 
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~other1/Heidegger%20Der%20Spiegel.pdf. Heidegger insisted that the 
interview not be published during his lifetime. It appeared in the magazine on May 31, 1976, five 
days after Heidegger’s death.  
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commitments.”48 A mere sixteen years later, Bush v. Gore,49 a case in 
which liberal Justices embraced conservative positions and conservative 
Justices embraced liberal positions, all in the service of partisan 
politics,50 thoroughly vindicated everything Singer had advocated. After 
Bush v. Gore, no one would seriously claim that law is objective, 
rational, and neutral. 
Singer was wrong, however, in his expectations of what would 
follow. In hindsight, it turns out that nihilism is not the easily managed 
insight that Singer had imagined. When nihilism really takes hold, when 
law embraces it, those passionate moral and political commitments 
become vicious, unending and unyielding, rendering human solidarity 
and dialogue unattainable. We see this in American political divisions, 
as mentioned above. But law itself now mimics politics in its endless 
controversies. Under nihilism, strife is inevitable because there is no 
standard—no norm—that could supply a nonarbitrary starting point in 
the search for values that could ground law, and by extension, ground 
our public life together.51 
A recent example of law professor nihilism is the reaction to the 
method of statutory interpretation utilized in Chief Justice Roberts’ 
opinion in King v. Burwell, the end-of-the-term case that upheld 
Affordable Care Act subsidies on federal insurance exchanges in the 
face of statutory language limiting subsidies to “an exchange established 
by the State.”52 The majority opinion held that this apparent meaning 
would contradict the purpose of the Affordable Care Act and therefore 
 
 48.  Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE 
L.J. 1, 9 (1984). 
 49. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 50.  Speaking only of the majority Justices, but I believe applicable to a certain extent as well 
to the dissents, Alan Dershowitz called the decision “the single most corrupt” in Supreme Court 
history on the basis of the partisan nature of the holdings and result. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, 
SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 174 (2001). Rick Garnett 
has reminded me, however, that the charge of shape-shifting in pursuit of predetermined and 
partisan result does not apply to the concurrence by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas. The emphasis in the concurrence on Art. II, §1, cl. 2 as granting authority to 
legislatures, as opposed to state courts is just the kind of strict textual reading that those three 
Justices might uphold in any case. 
 51.  In one of those “what goes around, comes around” moments, I heard the same Professor 
Singer on a panel at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the AALS on January 3, 2015, speak favorably of 
“better law” analysis, the pursuit of justice and conflicts rules in his current role as one of the 
nation’s leading experts in conflicts of laws. Of course, these are heavily normative concepts whose 
metaphysical weight is increasingly undermined by the death of values that Professor Singer once 
welcomed.  
 52.  135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
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rejected that interpretation of the language.53 
In a short opinion piece, John McGinnis defended Chief Justice 
Roberts against the charge that his majority opinion represented an 
unprincipled commitment to upholding the Affordable Care Act54—as 
the Chief Justice had done once before on what some considered a 
strained interpretation of the taxing power.55 McGinnis argued that the 
Chief Justice was using a well-established method of statutory 
interpretation and was not writing a merely result-oriented opinion. 
Nevertheless, McGinnis argued that Chief Justice Roberts was 
wrong in his conclusion for two reasons. First, the Affordable Care Act 
is a veritable kitchen soup of purposes and a mess of process. It is 
impossible to assign such a poorly drafted statute a well-defined 
purpose. Chief Justice Roberts even acknowledged this problem in the 
King opinion.56 
But the more fundamental reason that Chief Justice Roberts was 
wrong is that—and here McGinnis was relying on the work of Mark 
Movsesian57—it is inappropriate in general to rely on purpose when 
interpreting a statute. As opposed to a contract representing the 
intentions of two persons, “[F]ederal legislation is a product of 535 
legislators plus the president. It’s hard to distill an overriding intent or 
purpose from such a collection of wills, particularly in complex statutory 
schemes.”58 Therefore, the judge should rely wholly on the objective 
meaning of statutory language. 
To understand the depth of this challenge to collective rationality, 
note that both Movsesian and Justice Scalia, who makes a similar 
argument concerning statutory interpretation in his book, A Matter of 
Interpretation,59 rely heavily on Church of the Holy Trinity v. United 
States,60 in which the Supreme Court refused to apply the expansive 
language of a federal statute banning the importation of foreign labor to 
the contract of an Anglican Church and a priest. Both Movsesian and 
 
 53.  Id. at 2491. 
 54.  John O. McGinnis, John Roberts’s Principled Mistake, CITY JOURNAL, http://www.city-
journal.org/2015/eon0629jm.html. 
 55.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 56.  “The Affordable Care Act contains more than a few examples of inartful drafting.” King, 
135 S. Ct. at 2492. 
 57.  Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really “Legislative Bargains”? The Failure of the 
Contract Analogy in Statutory Interpretation, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1145 (1998).  
 58.  McGinnis, supra note 54.  
 59.  Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). 
 60.  143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
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Justice Scalia argue that the Justices in that case were substituting their 
personal preferences for the objective meaning of the statutory language. 
But even if one grants that this is what occurred in Holy Trinity, 
why is that one example supposed to be so persuasive? After all, there 
are many examples of reasonable judicial interpretations that seem to 
further the purposes of statutes straightforwardly and noncontroversially. 
Why is one counter example so important? 
The answer lies in the word “wills” in McGinnis’ piece above.61 
The problem with the statutory interpretation method of purpose is not 
that occasionally a judge will make a mistake, but that every use of the 
method ends up applying the policy preference of the judge because 
there is no such thing as a collective purpose. There is only individual 
will, which by its nature cannot be collective. 
That is why this challenge to King v. Burwell illustrates the death of 
values—it is a recapitulation of the nihilism of Margaret Thatcher, who 
once insisted that “there is no such thing as society. There are individual 
men and women, and there are families.”62 Individual will is the ultimate 
reality. Large numbers of people cannot share a purpose. 
Put that way, these criticisms of purpose seems absurd. Of course 
people join together to further great enterprises like the abolition of 
slavery or the fight against fascism. And, of course, overall evaluations 
are possible, such as “social security achieved its goal of ensuring that 
the elderly would not be destitute.” 
But, no. McGinnis accurately reflects the cynicism of public choice 
theory and the general skepticism with regard to rationality as anything 
other than means-end. He is reflecting the death of values. And the 
immediate responses that I raise above are just the residue of an earlier 
moral age. 
Although this challenge to statutory interpretation is usually voiced 
by conservatives, I believe its premises are quite widespread. Only 
satisfaction with certain judicial results from the application of 
legislative purpose—as in King itself—keeps law professors on the left 
from agreeing with McGinnis. 
Is there any alternative view in the legal academy? It might be 
 
 61.  McGinnis, supra note 54.  
 62.  Epitaph for the eighties? “there is no such thing as society”, THE SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 
31, 1987, http://briandeer.com/social/thatcher-society.htm. Other than sentimentality, I don’t know 
why Thatcher stopped with families as collective entities. Justice Brennan was willing once to say 
that there are no families, only the association of individuals: “[T]he marital couple is not an 
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with 
a separate intellectual and emotional makeup.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
Unfortunately, the tidal wave of divorce renders this a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
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argued that one major voice among law professors contested the death of 
values. Shortly before his death, in writing about religion, Ronald 
Dworkin argued strongly that values are objective. Ronald Dworkin’s 
last book, Religion Without God,63 demonstrates his long-standing 
commitment that religion is not a matter of belief in God and is a 
broader category than American law has generally viewed it. He writes: 
“Religion is a deep, distinct, and comprehensive worldview: it holds that 
inherent, objective value permeates everything, that the universe and its 
creatures are awe-inspiring, that human life has purpose and the universe 
order.”64 
But unlike Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lee, above, Dworkin 
argues that religion is for all of us, not just for believers in God. For 
Dworkin, the belief that a God underwrites objective value “presupposes 
a prior commitment to the independent reality of that value. That 
commitment is available to nonbelievers as well.”65 Thus, for the 
nonbeliever as well as for the believer, values “are as real as trees or 
pain.”66 
Here could be a response to Art Leff’s poem. Look to the stars, 
Dworkin would say to Leff. They neither spin nor reap, yet they are 
arrayed in loveliness. How can you say, among all this beauty and order, 
that everything is up for grabs? So, is the death of values solved? Can 
we turn to Dworkin’s assurance to address the death of values? 
Unfortunately, the answer is no. Dworkin was convinced, following 
David Hume, that an ought—a norm, or for our purposes, a value—
cannot be deduced from an is.67 Yet, Dworkin’s entire book is actually a 
demonstration of deriving an ought from an is. The universe is 
objectively inspiring of awe. Therefore we ought to feel awe. Dworkin 
does not acknowledge this. All he says is that we can experience awe. 
Contrary to Dworkin, a universe that is objectively awe-inspiring—
as a fact—thereby contains the norm that Dworkin insists we cannot get 
to. As C.S. Lewis put this very point, the norm is that the universe is, in 
fact, deserving of awe.68 What Dworkin does not see is that the 
 
 63.  RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013). 
 64.  Id. at 1. 
 65.  Id. at 2. 
 66.  Id. at 13. These concepts of objective values might be in some tension with Dworkin’s 
criticism of objective value as a “noumenal metaphysical fact” in Dworkin’s book Law’s Empire, 
but that matter is beyond my scope here. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 81 (1986).  
 67.  DWORKIN, supra note 63, at 26-27. 
 68.  “Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be such 
that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or incongruous to it—
believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but could merit, our approval or disapproval, 
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objectivity of values he propounds depends on deriving an ought from 
an is. That is the necessary foundation of objective values. 
It was because Hume did not endorse Dworkin’s kind of value 
objectivity that Hume held that an ought could not be derived from an is. 
Hume held that the mere fact that God exists is not a reason to worship 
and obey Him. But Hume would not, and could not, have said that the 
existence of a God who is objectively deserving of awe and reverence is 
not a reason to grant Him awe and reverence. It precisely would be such 
a reason. Dworkin’s would-be ontology of objective values is at war 
with his skeptical epistemology. The declared inability to derive an 
ought from an is, actually is the death of values. 
The state of affairs I am describing generally in our culture is 
dissatisfying to people. Postmodern thought does not, because it cannot, 
abolish the human thirst for real and lasting justice. Even a postmodern 
legal theorist like Helen Stacey knows this: “The deep longing for 
justice that comes from within our present epistemology remains the 
central concern to any legal analysis of events that is framed by a 
postmodern approach.”69 But, postmodern thought, which subscribes to 
and celebrates the death of values, cannot satisfy that thirst. 
Postmodernism asserts that freedom, which, in the absence of 
objective morality, becomes its dominant value, can serve as the basis of 
society even without truth. It is said with some pride that we have 
“subvert[ed] the concept of truth and . . . replace[d] it with the concept 
of freedom.”70 But this has led us to fruitful pursuit of neither freedom 
nor truth because the only authentic human freedom is the freedom to be 
free for truth, whether this is the truth of God, the truth of Being or the 
truth of reality itself. Freedom, isolated from a goal inherently 
worthwhile, is just will and drift. This drift is the posture of the death of 
values. 
Thus far, we may conclude that values in American law did indeed 
die in June 1992, as a part of a larger undermining of values in the 
culture and among the legal academy. But, what of it? What impact did 
the death of values have in law, and what impact does it continue to 
have? In the rest of this Article, I will show how the death of values 
grounds American constitutional development. Indeed, the death of 
 
our reverence, or our contempt.” C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN; OR, REFLECTIONS ON 
EDUCATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE TEACHING OF ENGLISH IN THE UPPER FORMS OF 
SCHOOLS 9 (1947).  
 69.  HELEN M. STACY, POSTMODERNISM AND LAW: JURISPRUDENCE IN A FRAGMENTING 
WORLD 15 (2001). 
 70.  Id. 
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values may be the hidden fulcrum of American constitutional law. 
IV. THE REFLECTION OF THE DEATH OF VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION OF RIGHTS 
The effect of the death of values may be seen in continuing 
difficulties in the interpretation of rights. We are not like the Framers of 
the Constitution. They believed that rights were real, while we do not. 
Because of this difference, it is difficult for us be faithful to the project 
of the Framers in creating constitutional government. 
This difference between the founding generation and legal 
interpreters today is most obvious in our view of the Ninth Amendment, 
which provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the 
people.” The Ninth Amendment could only have been written by 
persons who lived in a value-filled universe in which rights were not a 
matter of opinion, not a gift from government, and not grounded even in 
popular sovereignty. The Framers would not have agreed with the 
criticism by Robert Bork that the Ninth Amendment is like an inkblot 
that would allow judges to “make up constitutional rights,”71 nor with 
the assertion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist that if the Bill of 
Rights were repealed, Americans would not have those rights.72 For the 
Framers, rights were not made up. And rights were not dependent on 
attaining written form in any document. 
This conclusion is not lessened in any way by suggestions that the 
Ninth Amendment was intended to reinforce the limited enumeration of 
federal powers73 or to protect rights already set forth in state 
constitutions from federal interference74 or that the rights protected in 
the Ninth Amendment corresponded to common law rights.75 These 
 
 71.  See Ramesh Ponnuru, Judge Bork’s Ink Blot, NATIONAL REVIEW, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/336142/judge-borks-ink-blot-ramesh-ponnuru. 
 72.  See Bruce S. Ledewitz, The Questions Rehnquist Hasn’t Had to Answer, THE WALL 
STREET JOURNAL, Aug. 7, 1986 (quoting from a 1980 speech by Justice Rehnquist). For a different 
view of Rehnquist’s position on these matters, see Richard W. Garnett, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
Enduring, Democratic Constitution, 29 HARV. J. L.& PUB. POL’Y 395 (2006).  
 73.  Kurt T. Lash, The Sum of All Delegated Powers: A Response to Richard Primus, The 
Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 180, 198 (2014) (“The Ninth Amendment in 
particular prevents the addition of enumerated rights from impliedly undermining the general 
principle of limited enumerated power.”). 
 74.  See Wilfred J. Ritz, The Original Purpose and Present Utility of the Ninth Amendment, 
25 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 4 (1968) (quoting criticism of the Constitution by Brutus, an 
Antifederalist writer). 
 75.  See Andrew King, Comment, What the Supreme Court Isn’t Saying About Federalism, 
the Ninth Amendment, and Medical Marijuana, 59 ARK. L. REV. 755, 764 (2006) (“Under 
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claims may be true, but they would not be exhaustive. They would not 
be exhaustive because, in the view of the Framers, any right not yet 
established in a state constitution or recognized at common law would 
still be protected by the Ninth Amendment.76 The Framers did not have 
to artificially narrow the potential application of the Ninth Amendment 
because they were not haunted by moral skepticism. 
Because we don’t today believe in rights the way the Framers did, 
we either have to treat the Ninth Amendment as if it referred to the 
existence of ghosts and therefore ignore it, to use John Hart Ely’s 
famous example,77 or give the Amendment the sort of democratic 
procedural and anti-discrimination meaning that Ely ultimately gave it. 
The consequence of our skepticism is that we would assume that anyone 
invoking the Ninth Amendment to ground a substantive right must be 
utilizing a subjective value judgment because we believe there is no 
other kind of value judgment that can be made. 
But the Ninth Amendment is too easy a case. The implication of the 
death of values in its interpretation is almost too obvious to mention. 
The overall effect of the death of values on the interpretation of 
rights is to suppress substantive normative judgments in favor of 
procedural and equality norms even when the text of the Constitution 
seems to require substantive interpretation. I will illustrate this tendency 
in a short comparison between the Supreme Court’s interpretations of 
procedural due process and free speech—both a kind of procedural 
norm—and the failure of the Court to interpret the substantive 
constitutional concepts of cruelty and life, in the Eighth Amendment and 
the Due Process Clauses, respectively. 
The promise of procedural due process has a solid textual 
foundation in the Constitution. The Fifth Amendment applies to the 
actions of the federal government and provides as follows: “[N]or shall 
any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .” The Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to State 
 
Blackstone’s tutelage, a colonial American understood that natural rights were an inextricable part 
of the common law, ‘the birthright of the people of England.’”). The Framers expressed this 
understanding when they wrote the Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment.  
 76.  To this effect, Daniel A. Farber rightly quotes a supporter of the Constitution at the 
Pennsylvania ratification convention—”our rights are not yet all known”—in an online excerpt from 
his book, Retained by the People: The ‘Silent’ Ninth Amendment and the Constitutional Rights 
Americans Don’t Know They Have (2007), 
http://www.alternet.org/story/50404/the_%27silent%27_ninth_amendment_gives_americans_rights
_they_don%27t_know_they_have.  
 77.  JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW, 38-39 
(1981). 
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and local government, provides similarly, “[N]or shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” 
The interpretation by the Justices of procedural due process—the 
question whether a person receives a hearing before losing welfare 
benefits, for example—has been extremely free-wheeling in terms of 
history and text. The Justices do not worry about what the Framers 
thought due process might require, or what the Framers thought due 
process applied to, or what the public meaning of “due process” was 
when the texts were adopted, or even what the history of procedural due 
process was after the adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
Neither text, nor history, nor tradition have had much, if any, influence. 
Instead of all that kind of analysis, which forms the major part of 
constitutional interpretation when substantive constitutional provisions 
are at issue, the Justices have adopted an interpretive approach that has 
nothing to do with text and history. First, the Justices ask whether the 
government benefit of which the claimant is being deprived constitutes a 
liberty or property interest.78 Then, once the Justices conclude that 
liberty or property is involved, they openly balance the weight of the 
private interest against the weight of the government’s interest, in light 
of the risk of a decision-making error without the proposed procedural 
innovation.79 
In terms of free speech, the right at stake is not entirely procedural. 
The First Amendment, which, despite its wording, has been applied to 
state and local government as well, provides that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” Justice Louis 
Brandeis, for example, certainly believed that freedom of speech was 
more than an instrumental value. Brandeis wrote in his concurrence in 
Whitney v. California that freedom of speech constitutes a “means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”80 But he 
also wrote that: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the 
state was to make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its 
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. 
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed lib-
erty to the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.81 
This would appear to be a substantive vision of free speech as 
 
 78.  See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
 79.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
 80.  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 81.  Id. 
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constitutive of a good life. 
Perhaps the two approaches to free speech—instrumental as a path 
to truth and substantive as a way to live—are not all that different. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose encomium to “the competition of 
the market” as “the best test of truth” in his dissent in Abrams v. United 
States82 is as close as we have to an official ideology of free speech, 
joined Justice Brandeis’ Whitney concurrence after all. 
Nevertheless, when I call free speech procedural, I mean that the 
Justices do not themselves make any judgments about truth. Even though 
free speech may constitute a substantive aspect of a fulfilling human life, 
the judicial interpretation of free speech does not reach any such 
substantive claim. As Justice Lewis Powell put it in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc.: “Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a 
false idea.”83 The Justices see their job in applying the constitutional 
norm of freedom of speech as keeping the lines of communication open 
so that, in good Holmesian fashion, all ideas will be present so that 
others—the people, in democratic terms—can decide what to believe 
and how to live. 
This vision of free speech accords very well with the death of 
values because the Justices never proclaim that any idea is true or false. 
The only basis for excluding speech from constitutional protection 
becomes something like an immediate threat of specific criminal 
action84or demonstrable harm in the preparation of the speech, as in 
child pornography.85 No idea, even the advocacy of genocide or the 
denial of the holocaust, can be punished as simply untrue. 
This free speech interpretive approach is almost as devoid of text, 
history, and tradition as is the analysis of procedural due process. One 
example of this absence is Citizens United v. FEC, which held that 
corporate political speech is constitutionally protected.86 Despite some 
preliminary skirmishing between Justice Scalia’s concurrence and 
Justice Stevens’ dissent over the Framers’ view of corporate speech, 
Justice Scalia’s conclusion that the “First Amendment is written in terms 
of ‘speech,’ not speakers”87 is not really a textual or historical argument 
at all. The reason that corporate speech is protected is the Court’s own 
understanding of the meaning of free speech, and the protection of 
 
 82.  250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 83.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
 84.  See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) for the classic formulation of this test. 
 85.  See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 86.  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 87.  Id. at 392 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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corporate speech would not be reversed even if it could be shown 
conclusively that the Framers disagreed with that perspective.88 Justice 
Scalia put the matter as follows, in dissent, the first time the Court 
upheld political spending limits on corporations: 
The Court today endorses the principle that too much speech is an evil 
that the democratic majority can proscribe. I dissent because that prin-
ciple is contrary to our case law and incompatible with the absolutely 
central truth of the First Amendment: that government cannot be trust-
ed to assure, through censorship, the “fairness” of political debate.89 
This “absolutely central truth of the First Amendment” is obviously not 
thought by Justice Scalia to be a value judgment that must be voted on. 
This general commitment by the Justices decides free speech issues 
rather than text, or history, or tradition. 
Another example of the theory of free speech independent of text, 
history, or tradition was the treatment of laws punishing the burning of 
the American flag. In a pair of controversial cases striking down laws 
that punished burning the American flag in protest demonstrations,90 it 
was of no interest whatever to the majorities of the Justices that the flag 
might have received legal protections historically. The Justices believe 
they know, inherently, what free speech means. Despite Justice Scalia’s 
criticism of the concept in his dissent in Lee above, that meaning of free 
speech is “a philosophical predilection[].” 
I don’t mean to suggest that the Justices believe they are violating 
the intentions of the Framers of the First Amendment in any of the free 
speech cases. Rather, the Justices proceed in their interpretations from a 
very strong theoretical commitment as to the meaning of free speech, 
and that meaning is practically irrefutably presumed to be shared by the 
Framers.91 
 
 88.  This is not mere surmise on my part. Justice Scalia’s disdain for arguments raising the 
Framers’ view of free speech was on display in Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 
(2011), in which he wrote the majority opinion invalidating a California statute prohibiting the sale 
or rental of violent video games to minors. Justice Thomas argued in dissent that the “founding 
generation . . . believed parents to have complete authority over their minor children and expected 
parents to direct the development of those children.” Id. at 2758 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Therefore, 
minors do not have the right of free speech. Justice Scalia did not refute this historical argument but 
mainly countered that such an interpretation would allow the government to forbid minors from 
attending political rallies or church without parental permission. Id. at 2736, n. 3. Thus, for Justice 
Scalia, the theory of free speech trumps originalism.  
 89.  Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679-680 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 90.  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
 91.  I am not trying to show in this section that history is irrelevant to constitutional 
development outside the realms of substantive normative judgments, only that history and other 
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Now, contrast the treatment of procedural due process and the 
treatment of free speech with two substantive questions in constitutional 
law—what is a cruel punishment and whose life is protected by the 
Constitution? On these questions, there turns out to be little or no 
independent judgment by the Justices, who depend on various objective 
indicia to decide these issues. 
Unlike the unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment, these 
terms—”cruel . . . punishments” and “persons”—are in the Constitution, 
in the same way that “due process” and “free speech” are in the 
Constitution. Since that is so, there is no obvious reason for any 
difference in approaches to their interpretation. Yet, these substantive 
values are interpreted very differently. 
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.” My focus here is on cruel and unusual 
punishments. This language could have been interpreted as a term of art, 
meaning that it might have had no effect at all other than eliminating 
some of the more extreme forms of ancient common law sanctions that 
had already fallen out of use, or were in the course of doing so, in 
America prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights—sanctions such as 
branding, mutilation, and the use of the pillory and the stocks.92 
But the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments did not 
turn out to be restricted to such historical practices. In 1958, in Trop v. 
Dulles,93 the punishment of deprivation of citizenship of a native-born 
American citizen for wartime desertion was struck down. There was no 
majority opinion in the case. Chief Justice Earl Warren, speaking for 
four Justices, appealed to “the dignity of man” and “the principle of 
civilized treatment.”94 He added that the meaning of the Amendment is 
not static and “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Because of the 
utterly defenseless position of the expatriate—who has lost “the right to 
 
objective factors are crucial in avoiding such judgments. Besides procedural due process and free 
speech, there are other constitutional provisions that are interpreted quite loosely with respect to 
history. Regulatory takings are another example, as is the right to bear arms. While the opinion in 
D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), contained substantial originalist argument about the nature of 
the right to bear arms, the actual scope of that right—no concealed weapons, no possession by 
felons and no entry to sensitive areas—perfectly matched the policy needs of the Justices who wrote 
and joined the majority opinion and had little justification in history.  
 92.  On the other hand, as Justice Brennan pointed out in Furman v. Georgia, whipping and 
earcropping were still “quite common” when the Eighth Amendment was adopted. 408 U.S. 238, 
263 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 93.  356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 94.  Id. at 99. 
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have rights”—and because “[t]he civilized nations of the world are in 
virtual unanimity that statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment 
for crime,” expatriation is forbidden. Warren added that the death 
penalty could not stand as an “index of the constitutional limit on 
punishment” such that nothing less than death could be unconstitutional. 
The death penalty is a special case because of its historical sanction and 
widespread use. 
Trop could have ushered in a judicial examination of the concept of 
human dignity and its relation to cruelty, but it did not do so. Part of the 
reason for that is the word “unusual” as a limiting term. For example, in 
Harmelin v. Michigan, in 1991, the Court upheld mandatory prison 
sentences, partly on the ground that “[s]evere, mandatory penalties may 
be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been 
employed in various forms throughout our Nation’s history.”95 
But even apart from the word unusual, the Justices simply would 
not give any serious content to the meaning of cruelty. This reluctance 
became clear when the Justices came to consider the constitutionality of 
the death penalty per se, in Furman v. Georgia in 197296 and Gregg v. 
Georgia in 1976.97 In Furman, all American death penalties were held 
unconstitutional, though there was no majority opinion. Justices Potter 
Stewart and Byron White voted to strike down the death penalty as 
currently imposed because of the vagaries in the death penalty system 
and the infrequency of its imposition. Justice Stewart captured this 
feeling with the observation that: 
[t]hese death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that be-
ing struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people con-
victed of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehen-
sible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously selected random 
handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.98 
When reformed death penalty statutes came before the Court four 
years later, a guided discretion statute was upheld in Gregg,99 while new 
mandatory death penalty statutes were struck down.100 As long as 
 
 95.  501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (this portion of the lead opinion represented the Opinion of the 
Court). 
 96.  408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 97.  428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 98.  Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 99.  Guided discretion statutes were upheld the same day that Gregg was decided, in 
Florida—Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976)—and Texas—Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 
(1976). 
 100.  Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 
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sentencing juries and judges could consider mitigating factors in 
individual cases, the death penalty was held not to be cruel per se, since 
it comported with contemporary public opinion and served the 
traditional social purposes of retribution and deterrence. According to 
Justice Stewart’s lead opinion in Gregg, human dignity is satisfied by 
traditional punishments with the caveat that “the sanction imposed 
cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in the 
gratuitous infliction of suffering.”101 But since the unconstitutional 
common law penalties had, of course, themselves been inflicted in good 
faith in the sense that the authorities believed that they served legitimate 
penological functions, Stewart’s approach was actually not an 
interpretation of the meaning of human dignity. Something renders those 
punishments unconstitutionally cruel even though they served 
penological purposes, but we are not told what that is.102 
In the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court would decide more 
specific cruel and unusual challenges to the death penalty and related 
challenges to penalties imposed on juveniles. In a series of cases, the 
Justices held that the death penalty could not be imposed on persons 
with mental retardation,103 that the death penalty could not be imposed 
on persons under the age of 18 at the time of the crime,104 that the death 
penalty could not be imposed for non-homicide crimes against 
individuals,105 that a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole (LWOP) could not be imposed on a juvenile for a non-homicide 
crime,106 and that a mandatory LWOP sentence could not be imposed on 
a juvenile even for a homicide.107 
These cases rested generally on a purported lack of proportionality 
viewed through objective indicators of Trop’s “evolving standards of 
decency,” such as the small number of states that impose certain 
penalties and the infrequency with which the penalties are carried out, 
that are said to show a national consensus against the practice in 
question.108 
 
(1976).  
 101.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion). 
 102.  All Justice Brennan could say in his concurrence in Furman is that “[n]o one, of course, 
now contends that . . . branding and earcropping, which were common punishments when the Bill of 
Rights was adopted” are still constitutional. Furman, 92 S.Ct. at 2249. (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 103.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 104.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 105.  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 106.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 107.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (plurality opinion).  
 108.  See Id. at 2463, 2470. 
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Although these majority opinions relied heavily on objective factors 
and precedent, Justice Kennedy was careful to point out in Kennedy v. 
Louisiana that the Justices’ “own judgment” on the acceptability of the 
death penalty must also be brought to bear.109 But that judgment was 
limited to such matters as excessiveness and arbitrariness, which are not 
only objective but quasi-procedural. Nowhere in this case-law is there 
any thoughtful discussion of what constitutes the cruelty that violates the 
dignity of man. In that sense, everything about these cases is based on 
the objective factors of a supposed national consensus. 
It remained for the dissenters in these Eighth Amendment cases to 
point out that there is in fact no national consensus supporting these 
decisions, that they actually must thus rely on substantive moral 
judgments, and that these moral judgments are not justifiable since there 
is no such thing as a defense of a moral judgment. The opening of 
Justice Thomas’ dissent in Graham is representative: 
The Court holds today that it is “grossly disproportionate” and hence 
unconstitutional for any judge or jury to impose a sentence of life 
without parole on an offender less than 18 years old, unless he has 
committed a homicide. 
Although the text of the Constitution is silent regarding the permissi-
bility of this sentencing practice, and although it would not have of-
fended the standards that prevailed at the founding, the Court insists 
that the standards of American society have evolved such that the Con-
stitution now requires its prohibition. 
The news of this evolution will, I think, come as a surprise to the 
American people. Congress, the District of Columbia, and 37 States al-
low judges and juries to consider this sentencing practice in juvenile 
non-homicide cases, and those judges and juries have decided to use it 
in the very worst cases they have encountered. 
The Court does not conclude that life without parole itself is a cruel 
and unusual punishment. It instead rejects the judgments of those legis-
latures, judges, and juries regarding what the Court describes as the 
“moral” question of whether this sentence can ever be “proportion-
at[e]” when applied to the category of offenders at issue here. 
I am unwilling to assume that we, as members of this Court, are any 
more capable of making such moral judgments than our fellow citi-
zens. Nothing in our training as judges qualifies us for that task, and 
 
 109.  554 U.S. at 434 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opinion)). 
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nothing in Article III gives us that authority.110 
Justice Thomas, who has no trouble believing that majorities of 
voters might be willing to censure free speech unconstitutionally, cannot 
fathom that those same voters might be willing to treat unpopular 
criminals in a cruel fashion. Thus, for Justice Thomas, free speech is 
permitted to upend totally settled practices, such as the regulation of 
corporate political speech, whereas in the realm of substantive morality, 
legislatures must be accorded determinative weight. 
Undoubtedly, the Justices in the majority in Graham agreed with 
Justice Thomas’ ontological premise, which is why objective factors 
loom so large in the majority opinion. Under the death of values, no one 
is “any more capable of making” a moral judgment than is anyone else, 
and all moral opinions are entitled to equal weight. It follows that no 
such judgment can actually be right or wrong, and so Justice Thomas 
need not even attempt to show that the majority’s judgment is mistaken. 
All this is so even though the prohibition against cruel punishments is 
specifically given into the care of the judiciary. 
A second example of the failure of substantive judgment is the 
status of unborn children. The Due Process Clauses referred to above as 
protecting liberty and property in procedural cases, also protects “life.” 
But not all lives are protected; in each Amendment, only the life of a 
“person” is protected.111 
While it is often argued that due process is not a substantive 
protection, but only a procedural one, everyone agrees that this is not so 
with regard to the protection of life. A legislative decision that actually 
puts the lives of citizens at risk requires extraordinary justification. So, a 
draft in wartime is constitutional only because of the legislative 
judgment that the nation is at serious risk. But a law that allowed one 
citizen to kill another without the second person’s consent would 
undoubtedly be unconstitutional as a violation of the constitutional 
protection of life. 
This principle formed a background question when Roe v. Wade 
was argued before the Justices. If an unborn child is a person for 
purposes of due process, then it is, as Justice Stewart put it, “almost an 
impossible case” to argue for a constitutional right to choose abortion.112 
 
 110.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 97 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 111.  The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life . . . without 
due process of law . . . .” The Fourteenth Amendment provides “nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life . . . without due process of law . . . .” 
 112.  Transcript of oral argument of Roe v. Wade 41 (December 13, 1971), 
http://assets.soomo.org/ag/transcripts/roe-v-wade.pdf. 
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In fact, as Justice Stewart also pointed out during oral argument, if the 
fetus is a person, then a liberal abortion law—he used the law of New 
York State as an example—is “grossly unconstitutional” because it does 
not protect the lives of the unborn sufficiently. 
As Michael McConnell has written, the question of who is a person 
under the Constitution should have been unavoidable in Roe and had to 
have been answered as a substantive political judgment: 
Society has no choice but to decide to whom it will extend protection. 
It is not helpful to call this decision “private,” for there is no more in-
herently political question than the definition of the political communi-
ty.113 
Justice Blackmun’s Opinion for the Court in Roe conceded this point: 
The appellee . . . argue[s] that the fetus is a “person” within the lan-
guage and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, 
they outline at length and in detail the well-known facts of fetal devel-
opment. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant’s 
case, of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be 
guaranteed specifically by the Amendment.114 
But, instead of answering this question by either accepting or 
confronting these “well-known facts of fetal development,” Justice 
Blackmun sidestepped the question in a fashion familiar from the 
interpretive strategies of textualism and originalism. Justice Blackmun 
argued in effect that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
intend the word “person” to reach the unborn and that the public 
meaning of the word at that time would not have included the unborn.115 
And when Texas argued that, even apart from the question of 
personhood, the State should be permitted to protect the human life of 
the unborn child if it chose to do so, Justice Blackmun contended that 
the “difficult question of when life begins” could not be answered with 
any certainty.116 
The majority opinion in Roe is thus not, as it is often described, a 
decision dependent on the non-enumerated right of privacy. The right of 
a woman to choose a surgical procedure is certainly a form of liberty 
 
 113.  Michael W. McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1198 (1991). 
 114.  Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973). 
 115.  Id. at 157-59. 
 116.  Id. at 159 (“When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and 
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of 
man’s knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.”). 
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that was appropriate to protect given the prior case law. But the 
determinative question in Roe was the State’s purported justification for 
denying that right. And that justification failed because no substantive 
moral judgment about the status of the unborn child could be justified. 
So, the right to choose an abortion is premised on moral skepticism 
and, more generally, on skepticism about truth itself. That is what 
allowed the Justices to hide from the question of whether an unborn 
child is a human being. The law of abortion is a function of the same 
death of values that devalues “value judgments” in general. 
The widespread acceptance of the death of values among the 
Justices explains why there are no pro-life votes on the Supreme Court 
today. Not one Justice is willing to hold that unborn life is human life 
and that the fetus is a person for purposes of constitutional protection.117 
Even for judicial opponents of Roe, there is no willingness to make the 
moral judgment that the fetus is a human being. Thus, while disagreeing 
about whether Roe should be overturned, left and right agree on the 
death of values. 
Given the significance of the result, the question naturally arises 
whether Obergefell v. Hodges,118 the recent case that constitutionalized 
gay marriage, represented a renaissance in value-laden decision-making. 
One certainly would have expected that, given the prevailing echoes of 
the highly normative civil rights cases that surrounded the litigation—
Brown, Bolling v. Sharpe,119 and Loving v. Virginia.120 And, if Justice 
Kennedy, the author of the majority opinions in both Lee and Obergefell, 
 
 117.  Justice Stevens made the point in Casey in 1992: “no Member of the Court has ever 
questioned this fundamental proposition” [that] “as a matter of federal constitutional law, a 
developing organism that is not yet a ‘person’ does not have what is sometimes described as a ‘right 
to life.’” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 913 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring and dissenting in part). And this remains true to this day. No Justice on the Court has 
ever supported personhood for the unborn. 
 118.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 119.  See e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Campaign for Southern Equality and Equality Federation 
in Support of Petitioners, 2015 WL 1048449 (“In the context of the lives of the politically 
powerless—including gay Americans—this Court has a proud tradition of exercising its 
Constitutional authority when a controlling majority ‘identifies persons by a single trait and then 
denies them the possibility of protection across the board.’ Indeed, in the past, when political 
majorities disregarded the constitutional rights of political minorities, this Court has intervened to 
protect them.”) (internal citations omitted). See also, Stuart Gaffney, The Anticipation Builds, 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY USA (Jun. 9, 2015), http://www.marriageequality.org/anticipation_builds 
(noting Justice Kennedy’s comment during oral argument in Obergefell to the effect that 
“approximately the same amount of time has elapsed between the Supreme Court’s landmark LGBT 
rights decision in Lawrence and the current cases as had elapsed between Brown v. Board of 
Education and Loving, two of the Court’s landmark race discrimination cases.”).  
 120.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). For the normative underpinnings of the civil rights cases, see note 1, 
supra. 
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had written a normatively oriented opinion, then one might question the 
prior analysis of the Lee opinion, or at least acknowledge that Lee is not 
the whole story. 
Obergefell deserves more than the few words I can give it here, but 
it is not difficult to show the amoral structure of the majority opinion 
even without extended analysis. The heart of the opinion is at the end of 
the due process discussion where Justice Kennedy states that the case 
does not involve a new right but only the application of the previously 
established fundamental right to marry, based on history and tradition. 
Perhaps sensing how hollow that might sound, given the revolutionary 
change the case announces, Justice Kennedy adds that rights come not 
only from “ancient sources,” but also from a “better informed 
understanding”—more modern?—of how constitutional imperatives 
define liberty. None of this is grounded in anything beyond human 
consensus, hinted at in the opinion by the invocation of the phrase 
“cultural and political developments” to indicate growing societal 
acceptance of gay people. Justice Kennedy is obviously very 
sympathetic to the rights of gay persons. But he avoids any suggestion of 
natural rights or any normative commitments beyond human 
foundations. 
The problem for Justice Kennedy was that there obviously is not a 
full consensus in America about gay rights in general or gay marriage in 
particular. Many Americans still hold that gay marriage is unnatural and 
gay relationships immoral. 
The only way, really, to respond when there is such a disagreement 
is to admit it and to forthrightly assert that the counterview is morally 
wrong. That is how, famously, Charles Black responded to the criticism 
by Herbert Wechsler that Brown was not neutral but represented a value 
choice by the Court121—today we might say that Brown was not 
supported by originalist principles but rested on a value judgment. Black 
denied that the freedom of association of some whites, on the one hand, 
and equality in the context of discrimination, on the other, were of equal 
weight.122 But that was not Justice Kennedy’s response. 
 
 121.  Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959). 
 122.  Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 429 
(1960). Cass Sunstein is right that Black asserted to some degree an interpretation of equal 
protection as historical that originalism does not support. But Sunstein is projecting his own 
nihilism when he accuses Black of “a form of self-delusion, a claim of necessity that masks 
normative judgment of Black’s own.” Cass R. Sunstein, Black on Brown, 90 VA. L. REV. 1649, 
1661 (2004). I’m confident that Black understood that he was expressing a normative commitment. 
Unlike Sunstein, however, Black would not have understood that commitment as his “own.” Black 
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What Justice Kennedy did instead was what Justice Blackmun did 
in Roe—having established a right in precedent, thus avoiding any 
discussion of the genesis of the right, he put the burden of proof to limit 
it on opponents of the extension of the right. While Justice Kennedy was 
very careful not to describe opposition to gay marriage as irrational, he 
did characterize the views that gay marriage violates the inherent nature 
of marriage and/or is morally wrong as merely subjective—opponents 
base their conclusions on “religious or philosophical premises”;123 
“neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here”;124 they have 
“sincere, personal opposition.” But, in contrast, when such opinion 
“becomes enacted law,” the consequence is to “demean[] or 
stigmatize[]” same sex couples. 
It seems to me that this contrast of personal views and enacted law 
is meant to suggest that the mere opinions of opponents of gay marriage 
cannot counter the fundamental right to marriage already established. 
Opponents cannot point to any objective sense in which same sex 
couples are different from many heterosexual couples who, biologically, 
cannot have children. But, if the view that marriage is naturally between 
two persons of opposite gender and that gay relationships are immoral is 
subjective, then why is not the opposite view also subjective? So, in the 
end, must not the majority conclusion rest on the commitment that the 
opponents are wrong? Then, it would follow that their beliefs are 
disparaged, in the sense that they are substantively rejected. 
Justice Kennedy does not write this because of the death of values. 
In other words, if he had just written that same sex marriage is not 
immoral and that the opponents are wrong—as the entire Court in 
Brown, Bolling,125 and Loving,126 would have been happy to do—he 
would have had to face the old Leff “Sez who?”127 from Chief Justice 
Roberts in dissent—”Five lawyers have closed the debate and enacted 
their own vision of marriage as a matter of constitutional law.” Justice 
Kennedy had no answer to that. 
The answer to that challenge should have been, five lawyers now, 
but the truth of the matter will soon be apparent. After all, how is 
Obergefell any different from the judicial decision that women are 
 
would have regarded that commitment as true.  
 123.  Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2602. This is the same treatment that Justice Scalia gave 
philosophy above. 
 124.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 125.  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 126.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 127.  See Leff, supra note 46. 
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equal? That was not supported by history or tradition either. Justice 
Kennedy should have written, yes, we five believe it, and we may be 
wrong. But if we are wrong, history will correct us in the name of truth. 
That is what Justice Harlan might once have written.128 But Justice 
Kennedy could not. And you and I cannot either. Not without self-
consciousness—not without the feeling that there is no foundation under 
our feet. We all now live subject to the death of values. 
In addition to the general shape of constitutional interpretation, the 
death of values strongly influences one particular area—the role of 
religion and religious exemptions from the requirements of general laws. 
I will briefly set forth that influence in the next Part. 
V. THE REFLECTION OF THE DEATH OF VALUES IN THE STRUGGLE OVER 
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS 
American law is currently engaged in a controversy over the scope 
of religious exemptions pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA) and similar statutory and state constitutional provisions.129 
The Supreme Court decision exempting for-profit corporations from 
compliance with the Affordable Care Act contraception mandate in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Stores Inc.130 and the subsequent injunction in 
Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell,131 exempting a religious college from 
complying with the very accommodation that the parties in Hobby Lobby 
seemed to have won, point to a very broad judicial interpretation of the 
RFRA and a continuing divisive debate over the proper place of 
religious exemptions in American law. 
While the arguments involved in this debate are beyond my scope 
here, I hope to show that the overall shape of the debate over 
exemptions, on both sides, is formed by the view that religious beliefs 
are subjective and personal. The debate over religious exemptions is in 
that sense a reflection of the death of values. 
The exemptions debate takes place against the background of 
Employment Division v. Smith, which held in 1990132 that the Free 
Exercise Clause gives a religious practitioner no protection against 
 
 128.  Justice Harlan wrote of what we now call substantive due process, “That tradition is a 
living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive . . . .” 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 129.  See generally, Bruce Ledewitz, Experimenting With Religious Liberty: The Quasi-
Constitutional Status of Religious Exemptions, 6 ELON L. REV. 37 (2014). 
 130.  134 S. Ct. 2751(2014). 
 131.  134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014). 
 132.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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generally applicable laws that are formally neutral about religion. Thus, 
in the context of the Smith case, a law criminalizing the use of peyote is 
constitutional even when applied to sincere practitioners of a well-
established Native American religion that utilizes peyote in its core 
ceremonies, without any particular showing by the government why a 
religious exemption from the law could not be granted.133 
Smith was a thunderbolt. Although religious practitioners prior to 
Smith almost always lost their challenges against generally applicable 
laws—from a University arguing that race discrimination was religiously 
required134 to a religious group requesting exemption from the payment 
of social security taxes135—the government usually had to give some 
kind of special reason—called a compelling interest—for burdening a 
religious practice. That meant, at least as a practical matter, that the 
concerns of religious practitioners would have to be considered when 
government actions affected them. So, religious practitioners had some 
leverage. After Smith, that leverage was gone. 
The grounds of the Smith decision seemed surprising, given that 
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion. In response to the claim that the 
government was directly denying the right of the plaintiffs to the free 
exercise of religion by forbidding the use of peyote—a clearly textual 
argument—the textualist Scalia responded only “we do not think the 
words must be given that meaning.”136 Then the opinion added that prior 
case law had never granted protection to religious practitioners from 
neutral, generally applicable laws like the one at issue in Smith. The 
opinion did not reject the plaintiffs’ textual interpretation as implausible, 
nor did Justice Scalia bother to try to show that the commonly 
understood meaning of the “free exercise” of religion at the time of the 
adoption of the First Amendment would not have included the plaintiffs’ 
claims. 
Since the Smith opinion did not rely on text or history—the 
mainstays of conservative constitutional jurisprudence—on what did it 
rely? Surprisingly, the Smith opinion relied on the kind of policy 
argument that Justice Scalia usually rejects. According to Justice Scalia, 
any society that requires the government to produce a compelling 
interest every time a religious practitioner challenges a generally 
 
 133.  Although there were no criminal prosecutions in Smith—it was actually a case about the 
denial of unemployment compensation to drug counselors fired for using peyote in their religious 
practice—the opinion was written as if it had been a challenge to the criminal statute. 
 134.  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 135.  United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).  
 136.  494 U.S. at 878. 
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applicable law on the basis of the plaintiff’s own perception of the 
centrality and importance of the religious practice at issue “would be 
courting anarchy,” and this is especially true in a society of diverse 
religious beliefs, all of which are constitutionally protected.137 
But why could not all these hypothetical religious claims be 
winnowed by the judiciary? The plaintiffs in Smith were obviously 
sincere; no one could doubt the centrality and importance of their claim 
to their well-established religious practice; and, since a number of states 
grant a specific exemption for the religious use of peyote, why not force 
the government to explain why no religious exemption could be granted? 
Future cases with less significant religious claims could be dismissed. 
Justice Scalia explicitly warned that future cases with apparently 
lesser claims could not be dismissed. The importance and centrality of a 
religious practice could not be decided by a judge—”What principle of 
law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion 
that a particular act is ‘central’ to his personal faith?”138 And, although 
Justice Scalia did not have to rule on this issue, it would seem to follow 
that a judge could not decide whether a particular claim presented as 
“religious” really was religious. The reason for all of this inability is, as 
Justice Scalia wrote, that “faith” is “personal.” 
Justice Scalia was not worried that judges would judge these 
wrongly. The clear suggestion in Smith is that there is no norm by which 
such a judgment could be made at all. Religious faith is subjective—
always and only a matter of opinion—just as we saw above that value 
judgments in general are subjective. Therefore, it would also be 
subjective for a judge to weigh the importance of a religious practice. 
As if to make all this clear, at the end of the Smith opinion, Justice 
Scalia again warned against “a system in which each conscience is a law 
unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws 
against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”139 Such a system would be 
nothing but subjective opinion upon subjective opinion. 
To his credit, Justice Scalia did not want to leave religious 
practitioners without legal recourse. He reminded the authorities in 
Oregon that they were free to enact a statutory exemption for 
sacramental peyote use, as other states had done. Congress did precisely 
 
 137.  Id. at 888. There is something comical about the holding in Smith, given Justice Scalia’s 
opinion recognizing a personal constitutional right to own a working gun in District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In other words, according to Justice Scalia, a society courts anarchy if 
it allows religious practitioners to go to court, but not if it allows almost every citizen to be armed.  
 138.  Id. at 887. 
 139.  Id. at 890. 
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that, legalizing sacramental peyote use in 1994.140 But, the general 
reaction to Smith brought a great deal more than a specific religious 
exemption for peyote. 
Smith was so unpopular that it eventually triggered an almost 
unanimous response in Congress attempting to overturn the decision—
the RFRA.141 Originally, the RFRA restored the compelling interest test 
for courts to apply in any case in which the practice of religion is 
substantially burdened by federal, state, or local governments, even if 
that burden is occasioned by a law of general applicability. The Justices 
later held that Congress lacked authority to impose this burden on the 
states and localities.142 But that left the RFRA in place for challenges to 
federal laws. That is why the current religious challenges to the 
contraceptive mandate in the federal Affordable Care Act proceeded 
mainly under the RFRA. Meanwhile, many states have adopted their 
own versions of the RFRA or have reacted to Smith by increasing the 
protection of religious practice in other ways.143 
The RFRA did not change the subjective understanding of religious 
exemption claims. While the Hobby Lobby case concerned a subsidiary 
issue—the extent to which for-profit businesses and their owners could 
claim the protections of the RFRA—the Wheaton College case and 
affiliated litigation over the government’s accommodations for religious 
entities continue to raise the question of the extent to which the claims of 
religious practitioners can be challenged. Thus far, the Court has 
suggested, as Justice Scalia predicted in Smith, that plaintiffs claiming 
religious exemptions, if sincere, must be the sole judges of their 
religious needs.144 All that courts can do, aside from judging sincerity, is 
to apply the compelling state interest test. 
Naturally, critics of religious exemptions—and of religion itself—
 
 140.  The American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendment of 1994, 42 U.S.C.A. §1996(a) 
(Westlaw through P.L. 114-49). 
 141.  See Ledewitz, supra note 129, at 50. 
 142.  Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 143.  See Ledewitz, supra note 129. 
 144.  In Hobby Lobby, Justice Kennedy addressed the government’s argument that no religious 
exemption was needed to the contraception mandate because “the connection between what the 
objecting parties must do (provide health-insurance coverage for four methods of contraception that 
may operate after the fertilization of an egg) and the end that they find to be morally wrong 
(destruction of an embryo) is simply too attenuated . . . providing the coverage would not itself 
result in the destruction of an embryo; that would occur only if an employee chose to take advantage 
of the coverage and to use one of the four methods at issue.” 134 S. Ct. at 2777. Justice Kennedy 
made it very clear, with italics, that the RFRA protects the right of “objecting parties to conduct 
business in accordance with their religious beliefs.” Id. at 2778. Not in accordance with religious 
practices the courts find to be reasonable.  
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concede that religious claims are wholly subjective. For someone like 
Brian Leiter, in his book, Why Tolerate Religion?,145 that subjectivity is 
one reason to eliminate religious exemptions. If religious exemptions are 
eliminated, society suffers no loss of knowledge, since religion has 
nothing to do with truth.146 
But, undoubtedly for strategic reasons, defenders of religious 
exemption—and of religion itself—also argue that religious claims are 
wholly subjective. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, a well-known and highly 
respected student of religion, was scathing in her criticism of Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent in the Wheaton College case, accusing her of 
challenging the rationality of religious beliefs: 
Justice Sotomayor is sputtering mad about the Wheaton College in-
junction. She says that, while she does not deny the sincerity of its re-
ligious belief, the College failed to make a showing that filing a form 
requesting an exemption is a substantial enough burden to trigger a 
RFRA claim. Shifting to an argument about substantiality is an effort 
to avoid challenging the rationality of their religious belief, but that is 
exactly what she is doing. They say that filing the form is enough to 
make them complicit with evil. Who is she to say nay without getting 
into exactly the theological battle she is trying to avoid when she 
claims to respect them?147 
It is easy to see that the treatment of religious exemptions as 
completely subjective is not sustainable as a practical matter. In the 
absence of objectivity of any kind—in the absence of coherence of any 
kind—religious exemptions must eventually become conscience 
exemptions and the protections for all such claims must be watered 
down so that government does not become impossible. 
This Article is not the context to consider how all this might be 
changed or whether it can be or should be. The point here is that the 
controversy over religious exemptions has its roots in the presumed 
inability, and certainly the unwillingness, of the Justices to make 
judgments about religious claims. And the controversy today continues 
to manifest this purely subjective quality. The struggle over religious 
exemptions is another example of the consequences of the death of 
values. 
 
 145.  BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2013). 
 146.  Id. at 63. 
 147.  Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, THE IMMANENT 
FRAME (Jul. 8, 2014), http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2014/07/08/impossibility-of-religious-freedom/. 
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VI. COPING WITH THE DEATH OF VALUES 
How does law go on in the face of the death of values? The prior 
sections suggest that there are two basic ways to cope, one conservative 
and one liberal—restrictive methods of constitutional interpretation, on 
the one hand, and the autonomy of individual choice on the other. I will 
take up both of those strategies here. But, first, I will take up the denial 
of the depth of the death of values as a coping mechanism. 
In this section, these three coping mechanisms are basically set 
forth. An analysis of their implications follows in Section VII. Even a 
mere listing of these coping mechanisms, however, must briefly indicate 
the basic flaws in the three positions. In different ways, each of these 
three strategies is deformed by its failure to confront the death of values 
in full and endure the dead end to which the death of values has brought 
American law. Coping itself is not an adequate response to our situation. 
A. The Death of Values is Only Apparent 
In his influential book, Laws Quandary,148 Steven Smith treats 
statements like the one in Casey about the wrongness of Plessy as 
evidence of what he calls an ontological gap—the gap between what 
lawyers think we believe to be real, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the commitments we make and keep that appear to assume that other 
kinds of matters are real. Specifically, Smith writes that legal elites 
believe, or imagine they believe, that only material things are real—
particles and forces from a certain view of science—but speak and act as 
if something like justice could be real, as in the injustice of Plessy the 
day it was decided. References to what the law “is” or what “the 
Constitution” contains no longer make sense given the ontological 
commitments of at least our legal elites. 
Smith proposes that this ontological gap comes from a failure to 
take metaphysics seriously. He tries to do that by paying attention to our 
presuppositions—what we mean when we speak of “the law of Equal 
Protection” or cases wrongly decided. Understanding our language 
would help lawyers own up to the ontological gap. 
At the end of Law’s Quandary, Smith asks what we can do about 
our ontological gap. But since he does not propose that lawyers stop 
referring to “the law,” he really means what can we do about our meager 
ontological commitments? In my terms, the question becomes, what can 
we do about the death of values? 
 
 148.  STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004). 
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Smith has two suggestions. One way out is the way of faith, 
symbolized for Smith by the work of the legal philosopher Joseph 
Vining. The other way is a kind of humble confession of our 
circumstances and an openness to richer realities than we have yet 
known. But none of this is specified by Smith. It is merely sketched. 
How serious is the ontological gap for Smith? Smith says that our 
moral commitments are nonsense given our ontology. But he also writes 
that we can go on this way for a long time. Perhaps that is why Smith 
does not concern himself too much with what should be done. 
Or, it may be that Smith does not believe there really is an 
ontological gap. Smith is so enamored of the habits of lawyerly life—
references to cases and holdings and so forth—that he attributes to them 
a kind of alternative ontology in which law is real and discovered rather 
than imposed by judicial and legislative fiat and through which the 
unified intention of a single author—classically, God—is revealed in the 
coherence of law as a whole. This alternative ontology then contradicts 
the naturalism, positivism, and materialism of modern and postmodern 
legal thinking that excludes in principle such inspired unity. Since one 
cannot really hold both of these positions, Smith acknowledges that 
some form of bad faith is operative among lawyers. But he suggests that 
most lawyers actually accept the ontology of classical law and more or 
less mouth the skepticism of postmodernity insincerely. 
Unfortunately, for Smith and for us, the prior material as a whole 
strongly suggests that he has it backward. Lawyers and judges really are 
subject to the death of values and the skepticism that grounds it. Perhaps 
lawyers and judges would like to believe differently, and even may 
privately believe differently, but in the formation of law, the death of 
values is supreme. 
As to why these lawyerly habits persist, I will suggest in Part VIII 
below the roles that these habits play in law school training. 
B. Consensus, Tradition, and Originalism 
These are the moves through which the political right in law copes 
with the death of values. They enable conservatives to identify 
constitutional rights, or to fend such claims off, without having to decide 
any substantive normative issues. 
Consensus entered into its modern role through interpretation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 
In a series of decisions since 2002, mentioned above, a 5-4 majority of 
the Court has found a national consensus against various applications of 
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punishments, such as imposition of the death penalty against persons 
with mental retardation or the use of a sentence of life imprisonment 
without parole against a juvenile in a non-homicide case.149 A four-
Justice dissenting bloc has agreed that the existence of a national 
consensus is a proper ground from which to interpret the Eighth 
Amendment but has denied that such a consensus exists in each 
instance.150 
Consensus is pretty obviously irrelevant to Eighth Amendment 
interpretation despite what the Justices say in these cases. Surely those 
punishment practices the Eighth Amendment is deemed to have barred 
from its beginning—such as the corporal punishments of the colonial 
era—cannot be revived by a new national consensus to bring them back. 
Nor should a punishment regarded as cruel be protected from 
constitutional prohibition simply because a national majority supports it. 
The simple problem with consensus is that it has nothing to do with 
interpreting cruelty. If the Constitution gives the task of interpretation to 
the courts, and if cruel punishments are to be banned, then the Justices 
should be trying to decide what it is that makes a punishment cruel. That 
task is not diminished by referring to it as philosophy or moral theory. It 
is the task the Constitution sets. What is cruelty? Not what I believe is 
cruel or can prove to be cruel beyond possible objection. Just, what is 
cruelty? The reason this task is not undertaken is the fear, really the 
certainty, that any answer given will be subject to the subjectivity of 
value judgments. 
The second move of conservative jurisprudence, the 
constitutionalization of tradition, is an unjustified extension of judicial 
authority, which was the immediate criticism by Justice White when the 
matter was first raised in a modern constitutional context in Moore v. 
East Cleveland: “What the deeply rooted traditions of the country are is 
arguable; which of them deserve the protection of the Due Process 
Clause is even more debatable.”151 
The danger of judicial overreach in promoting an unbounded 
constitutional protection for tradition was noted by conservative thinkers 
at the time.152 And Justice Scalia has attempted to cabin the doctrine of 
tradition by reference to a proper level of generality in his famous 
 
 149.  See notes 103-10, supra. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  431 U.S. 494, 549 (1977) (White, J., dissenting). 
 152.  See e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic 
Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1 (1981). 
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footnote 6 in Michael H. v. Gerald D.153 
But the need to limit tradition just raises the question: why should 
tradition be constitutionally protected in the first place? After all, any 
tradition that a national majority wants to incorporate into the 
Constitution can be incorporated by constitutional amendment. To grant 
protection without amendment is reminiscent of Professor Bruce 
Ackerman’s suggestion that the Depression and the response to it in the 
New Deal should be regarded as a de facto amendment of the 
Constitution,154 a suggestion that conservative constitutional thought has 
generally rejected.155 
One important reason that tradition occupies a constitutional role is 
that it allowed Justice Scalia to parry the challenge by the lead opinion 
in Casey that, without a constitutional protection of abortion, the 
government could forbid a couple from having more than one child.156 
The obvious answer to this, given Justice Scalia’s general commitments, 
should have been that the Constitution does not cure all ills. But Justice 
Scalia could not bring himself to concede that the right of childbirth is 
subject to government control. So, in footnote 1 in his dissent, he 
claimed that abortion is not protected by tradition, but childbirth is. 
Except for the domination of the death of values, he could have said 
straightforwardly that abortion is morally wrong, while childbirth is 
not—which I presume Justice Scalia inwardly believes. 
The third move of conservative constitutionalism, originalism, is its 
major contribution to constitutional interpretation and need not represent 
a rejection of the rational unfolding of a value judgment. The public 
meaning of a text and the practices against which it was aimed, could 
enable the formulation of a principle of what a text means. That 
principle could then be applied in a value-laden way. 
But the rejection of value judgments will not apparently allow even 
that much rationality into constitutional interpretation. Thus, in Town of 
Greece v. Galloway,157 and in dissents in Lee, and later in McCreary 
 
 153.  491 U.S. 110, 127 n. 6 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 154.  1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1992) (New Deal was the 
third constitutional moment in American history constituting constitutional change); 2 BRUCE A. 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000) (acts of popular sovereignty can amend 
Constitution). The argument is continued in 3 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). 
 155.  See e.g., Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 2576 
(2014). 
 156.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980, n.1 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 157.  134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
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County v. ACLU,158 it is strongly suggested that the existence of a 
practice at the time of the adoption of a constitutional text—legislative 
prayer, graduation prayer, and public references to God—immunizes 
that practice from constitutional challenge—an approach that would 
have insulated both racial segregation and anti-miscegenation statutes 
from constitutional challenge.159 
The objection that originalism represents moral relativism in 
tension with the commitments of the founding generation has been ably 
and consistently set forth by the noted conservative thinker, Harry V. 
Jaffa.160 Despite often agreeing with the results that conservative jurists 
reached, Jaffa declared that the foundations of originalism lay in “legal 
positivism, grounded in moral relativism and philosophical 
nihilism . . . .”161 
Professor Jaffa particularly points to a statement written by then-
Justice Rehnquist in 1976 with regard to inherent rights under the 
American Constitution: 
If such a society adopts a constitution and incorporates in that constitu-
tion safeguards for individual liberty, these safeguards indeed do take 
on a generalized moral rightness or goodness. They assume a general 
social acceptance neither because of any intrinsic worth nor because of 
any unique origins in someone’s idea of natural justice but instead 
simply because they have been incorporated in a constitution by the 
people.162 
Jaffa regards this statement as a heresy against our constitutional 
tradition. He writes: “Now I venture to say that 99.9% of the American 
people—outside the academy—do not believe this, nor should they. If 
the day comes when they do believe it, constitutional liberty will 
crumble into dust.”163 
 
 158.  McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 US 844, 893 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“With respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, it is entirely 
clear from our Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of 
polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”).  
 159.  Granted, Justice Scalia specifically denies that history immunizes unconstitutional 
practices, id. at 892, but what else but the pure fact of original practice allows the exclusion of 
polytheists from the principle of religious nondiscrimination Justice Scalia otherwise admits is the 
meaning of the Establishment Clause? Id. at 893. 
 160.  See HARRY V. JAFFA, ET. AL., ORIGINAL INTENT & THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1994). 
 161.  Harry V. Jaffa, Graglia Quarrels With God: Atheism and Nihilism Masquerading as 
Constitutional Argument, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 715, 716 (1996). 
 162.  William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of A Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 704 
(1976). 
 163.  Jaffa, supra note 160, at 735-36. 
44
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss1/4
04 LEDEWITZ MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2015  1:22 PM 
2016] WHEN VALUES DIED IN AMERICAN LAW 159 
But I venture to say that the day has come. What is Eric Posner’s 
attack on human rights in his new book, The Twilight of Human Rights 
Law,164 but an updated version of Rehnquist’s legal positivism, now 
transferred to a critique of the notion of human rights at the international 
level? Human rights are inherent for all or they are not inherent. 
Recently, Steven Smith has attempted to defend a version of 
originalism that he terms “decisional originalism,” which he believes to 
be both more rational and more deferring to proper constitutional 
authority than the “principle originalism” I was describing above.165 This 
Article is not the place to discuss his proposal—although I have to point 
out that following ancient expectations detaches judicial decision-
making from current meaning in such a way that it undermines any 
legitimacy that judicial review has.166 But one can see the death of 
values in the option of judicial review that Smith suspects non-
originalists are actually practicing, but can never admit—”[J]udges 
address the issues on the merits and give what seems to them the fairest 
of most sensible answers.”167 This is more or less the method of 
substantive due process interpretation that Justice John M. Harlan 
favored and if we believed that value judgments could correspond to 
something real, as Justice Harlan did, judges could engage in that 
approach expressly.168 
In any event, as shown above, no form of originalism is utilized by 
conservative constitutional jurisprudence when constitutional norms do 
not seem to require value judgments, as in free speech and procedural 
due process. It is in this sense that originalism allows an escape from the 
need for value judgments and thus copes with the death of values. 
C. Individual, Sovereign Choice 
Although quite different in apparent method, Jaffa correctly 
concludes that what passes for liberal constitutional method, is rooted in 
“that very same legal positivism” that animates conservative 
constitutional interpretation.169 The difference is that conservative 
 
 164.  ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014). 
 165.  Steven D. Smith, Meanings or Decisions? Getting Originalism Back on Track, LIBRARY 
OF LAW AND LIBERTY (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/meanings-or-
decisions-getting-originalism-back-on-track/. 
 166.  Smith’s approach would have ruled out Loving and Equal Protection’s heightened 
scrutiny for gender discrimination, for example. 
 167.  Smith, supra note 165. 
 168.  For a fuller indication of Justice Harlan’s approach, see Bruce Ledewitz, Justice Harlan’s 
Law and Democracy, 20 J.L. & POL. 373 (2004). 
 169.  Jaffa, supra note 160, at 716. 
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thought tends to aim at judicial deference to forms of group social life, 
past and present, while liberal thought aims at judicial deference to the 
sovereign individual. 
In its first appearance, this hyper-individualistic approach was the 
move of the political left to defend unpopular fundamental rights without 
having to assert the objectivity of values that, it was felt, could not be 
defended directly. But the move is now migrating into the realm of 
religious practice under the Free Exercise Clause and the RFRA. 
As explained above, the lead opinion in Casey defended the right to 
choose abortion precisely at the point, and in the service of, individual 
choice. Both in Casey and before, in Roe, this strategy of argument took 
advantage of the death of values by positing the right of privacy and then 
asserting that the government could not prove that its value judgment 
prohibiting the practice at issue was objectively justified. 
The downside of this approach was not immediately apparent in the 
abortion context. For in that context, the government’s underlying 
value—life—was conceded to be objective. The issue was only at what 
point life begins. 
But when this same strategy of individual self-determination was 
employed in gay rights cases, the result was much more radical. For, in 
those cases, the government’s justification for banning, first gay sexual 
expression, and then gay marriage, was that the government viewed the 
practices in question as immoral. Justice Stevens’ view in dissent in 
Bowers, which was adopted by the majority in Lawrence, condemned 
the government’s right to this moral judgment: “[T]he fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice.”170 
This was a revolutionary approach to the legitimate state interest 
test, for it fully separated law from morality. And this separation has 
since been adopted in other cases.171 
Although Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Lawrence, criticized the 
divergence of law from morality—this “proposition is . . . out of 
accord . . . with the jurisprudence of any society we know”172—he 
should not have done so. The separation between law and morality 
follows inevitably from the view he expressed nine years earlier in 
dissent in Casey that value judgments are nothing more than matters of 
 
 170.  Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 171.  In gay marriage cases, for example. See infra note 175. 
 172.  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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opinion. If gay people have the liberty to engage in sexual relations, as 
Justice Scalia conceded in Lawrence,173 how could the merely contrary 
opinion of society be considered a legitimate basis upon which to forbid 
the conduct?174 To put this plainly, if values cannot be rational, but can 
only be a construct, then values can never be a legitimate basis on which 
to found a coercive legal judgment. Only if society’s claim against gays 
were a claim of truth, could the repression in Lawrence be justified. But 
then the Justices would have to forthrightly face and evaluate this claim 
of truth.175 
The other side of this coin of individual choice is the growing 
notion that religious practices are entirely non-rational.176 As described 
above, no matter how extreme and arbitrary a religious claim seems to 
be, there can be no second guessing by judges except to test the sincerity 
of the religious believer. In this way, unreviewable, individual choice, 
which was originally a claim from the political left, has now migrated to 
be a claim by the political right. Such is the power of the death of values. 
VII. THE DARK SIDE OF COPING WITH THE DEATH OF VALUES 
The coping mechanisms described above lead law to monstrous 
moral arguments, the eventual collapse of morality, the illegitimacy of 
constitutional government and the loss of democracy. These coping 
mechanisms are a major reason why law schools emptied out in the 
recent economic downturn. 
But, of course, it is not really the coping mechanisms that are the 
issue. They are merely the symptoms of law’s failure to confront the 
death of values. I don’t mean a failure to “cure” the death of values—for 
Heidegger never promised that nihilism would be overcome—I only 
mean that the failure to seek knowledge of nihilism is killing law. 
 
 173.  Id. at 586. 
 174.  Granted, the actual formulation of the test is rationally related to a legitimate interest, 
thus turning reason into mere instrumentality. But I assume Justice Scalia would wish to defend the 
rationality of the government’s interest. Nevertheless, the death of values undermines that effort.  
 175.  Cases striking down gay marriage bans have pursued two strategies to avoid evaluating 
substantive moral claims by government. In some cases, as in Lawrence, the courts deny that moral 
claims can justify government action. See e.g., Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 552 (W.D. 
Ky. 2014). In others, the courts hold, as in Roe, that given the fundamental right to marry, the 
government’s moral claim cannot be proven with sufficient certainty to overcome heightened 
scrutiny. See e.g., Whitehood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 423-24, 430-31 (M.D. Pa. 2014). 
 176.  See discussion, supra Part V.  
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A. The Justification of Immorality 
In his dissent in Casey, Justice Scalia felt the need to contest the 
assertion by the lead opinion that the Justices were engaging in 
“‘reasoned judgment’” in their interpretation of the Constitution.177 But, 
consistently with the death of values, Justice Scalia contested this 
assertion not by showing that the right to choose abortion is unreasoned, 
but by asserting that no such judgment could be reasoned: 
The whole argument of abortion opponents is that what the Court calls 
the fetus and what others call the unborn child is a human life. Thus, 
whatever answer Roe came up with was bound to be wrong, unless it is 
correct that the human fetus is in some critical sense merely potentially 
human. There is, of course no way to determine that as a legal matter; 
it is in fact a value judgment. Some societies have considered the new-
born children not yet human, or the incompetent elderly no longer so. 
The emptiness of the “reasoned judgment” that produced Roe is dis-
played in plain view by the fact that, after more than 19 years of effort 
by some of the brightest (and most determined) legal minds in the 
country, after more than 10 cases, the best the Court can do to explain 
how the word ‘liberty’ must be thought to include the right to destroy 
human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply dec-
orate a value judgment and conceal a political choice.178 
But why can’t the humanity of the fetus be determined as a legal 
matter? Law in the Due Process Clause instructs the courts to protect 
“life.” Why can’t law borrow from other disciplines to decide that 
matter, as it sometimes does, for example, to decide whether a stream is 
navigable?179 Don’t the advances in fetal imaging suggest that at least at 
some point the fetus is fully human? Why, in other words, can’t Justice 
Scalia argue that the lead opinion is wrong in its reasoned judgment, 
rather than asserting that reason can have nothing to do with it? 
All Justice Scalia can say is that the humanity of the fetus is a value 
judgment and therefore a matter of opinion. And then he even expands 
this line of argument to include the decision to kill a newborn baby and 
an incompetent older person. 
Let Justice Scalia’s monstrous argument reverberate for a moment: 
 
 177.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992). 
 178.  Id. at 983-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting.) 
 179.  Compare the references by Justices Scalia and Kennedy to Leibowitz & Nadeau, Isolated 
Wetlands: State–of–the–Science and Future Directions, 23 WETLANDS 663 (2003) in Rapanos v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 756, n. 15, 782 (2006). Of course the references might be mere 
window dressing on formal and ideological reasoning. 
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If society decided to allow newborn children to be killed, the courts 
could do nothing about it. It would be a value judgment. Justice Scalia 
must say this for he has already refused, in advance, to consider whether 
the fetus is human—”The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on 
demand . . . .”180 
No common law judge would have treated values this way. Bob 
Cover, in his book Justice Accused, reminds us that some judges, even 
without justification in positive law, engaged in legal interpretation 
during the slavery period “in favorem libertatis.”181 They would never 
have suggested that the value of freedom was just a matter of opinion. 
How then can life be? 
This is what happens when judges accept the death of values as 
something natural and inevitable. They end up afraid to challenge the 
indefensible. 
B. The Collapse of All Morality 
It takes the Stevens/Kennedy position in Bowers/Lawrence to make 
the point express—so express that Justice Scalia is startled at the 
implications of the death of values he had himself assented to—that 
since all moral claims are matters of opinion, government may never act 
to defend morality and may never invoke morality to defend its actions. 
This position has not garnered the scorn it deserves for it is viewed 
as the only basis on which to defend gay rights from government 
prohibition. I will return to that issue in a moment. But, what about all of 
the rest of government regulation? Don’t progressives realize that the 
entire edifice of the social welfare state rests upon the moral judgment 
that the rich have enough, given the inequalities of income in society, 
and so must be forced to share their wealth with others? 
What kind of claim is this other than a moral one? The wealth of 
the rich does not itself harm the poor. Their acquisition of wealth has not 
violated society’s rules. Nor is redistribution fully justified to avoid 
immediate harm, such as starvation or homelessness. No, it is just right 
that the rich be made to share. 
The justification of income redistribution is a much disputed matter. 
I don’t mean here to establish anything with regard to it, except that the 
pure statement that moral judgments cannot justify government coercion 
would undermine income redistribution. 
 
 180.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 979 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 181.  ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 62 
(1975). 
49
Ledewitz: When Values Died in American Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
04 LEDEWITZ MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2015  1:22 PM 
164 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:115 
But unless morality is constructed, mustn’t the courts defer to 
majority prohibitions against gay rights? Not necessarily. It is only the 
death of values that suggests that there is safety in the collapse of 
morality. Gay rights could be defended as morally right and laws 
discriminating against gay people could be condemned as morally 
wrong. 
A bold Court in Lawrence could have said that the moral claim by 
the government in that case was irrational without suggesting that all 
moral claims are irrational. That would have been difficult in the current 
atmosphere. But the reason we believe such a position hard to defend is 
the very death of values that is undermining morality and undermining 
law. 
C. The Illegitimacy of Constitutional Government 
Up to this point, I have been emphasizing the interpretation of the 
Constitution and the content of law under the death of values. But there 
is another, deeper aspect of our situation. One of the necessities of any 
form of government is its account of why it is legitimate. Because of the 
death of values, it is no longer clear that constitutional government is in 
fact legitimate. 
On January 3, 2014, at the annual convention of the American 
Association of Law Schools, the Section on Constitutional Law 
sponsored an unusual discussion. Normally, some topic currently before 
the Supreme Court is discussed on such occasions. But, instead of that 
kind of program, the Section addressed the topic, “The Importance of 
Constitutionalism.” The description of the topic made it clear that the 
issue raised was, in effect, the legitimacy of our constitutional 
government from the perspective of political theory and what could be 
called the perspective of “We the People of the United States.” 
Four scholars were selected to make presentations. For my purpose 
here, the key exchange was between Sanford Levinson, from the 
University of Texas Law School, and Randy Barnett, from Georgetown. 
Levinson led off the program with an attack on the undemocratic nature 
of the Constitution. Levinson’s arguments were similar to those raised in 
the classic book, How Democratic is the American Constitution?, by 
Robert Dahl.182 
Then Barnett countered with an electrifying presentation. In effect, 
he accused Levinson, and by extension, most of the law professors 
 
 182.  ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? (2d ed. 2003). 
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present—for most of us certainly agreed with Levinson, including me—
of a lack of constitutional faith. From the perspective of the Constitution, 
the legitimacy of democracy is not to be presumed. It would be closer to 
the understanding of the Framers to assert that the legitimacy of 
democracy itself, understood as rule by the majority, is the problem with 
which the Constitution was intended to deal. The undemocratic elements 
of the Constitution should be thought of as protections of the natural 
rights of each individual citizen from illegitimate coercion by the 
majority. The proper question, therefore, is how well the Constitution 
accomplishes that task. Barnett’s presentation encapsulated his book, 
Restoring the Lost Constitution.183 
Barnett was the perfect person to issue this challenge. He was the 
instigating thinker behind the constitutional challenge that, but for Chief 
Justice John Roberts’s surprising holding that penalties are taxes, would 
have upended the Affordable Care Act.184 Barnett has made it his 
purpose to restore the understanding of the proper role of government in 
America to that of the Declaration of Independence: 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That 
to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriv-
ing their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . . 
As Barnett understands it, the nature of consent to the coercive 
power of government for the Framers was not any actual or expressed 
consent, nor presumed consent manufactured from not leaving a 
jurisdiction. Rather, human beings hypothetically consent to government 
as long as their unalienable—natural—rights are respected. While this 
understanding of the Constitution does not justify each particular 
undemocratic element in it, it does change the focus of debate away 
from majoritarianism to the protection of rights. 
Barnett’s vision is of course not original. It is a lost way of 
understanding the relationship between the citizen and her government. 
And it is a powerful justification for something like our form of 
government. The other influential consent theory is that of John Rawls. 
But Rawls’ “original position” from which hypothetical persons, who do 
not know what their endowments and position in society would be, 
choose political arrangements that are then considered just, suffers from 
 
 183.  RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (Princeton University Press rev. ed. 2014). 
 184.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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its unreality.185 Rawlsian thinking collapsed in recent years under, 
among other things, the pressure from religious practitioners who 
considered their religious commitments more fundamental than any 
political commitments.186 In any event, Rawls was not mentioned, as far 
as I remember, in that January discussion. 
The difficulty with Barnett’s position today, under the power of the 
death of values, is that it presupposes that natural rights are real. This 
foundation is clear in his book when Barnett quotes the sermon of Elizur 
Goodrich delivered to the governor and legislature of Connecticut on the 
eve of the Constitutional Convention: 
The principles of society are the laws, which Almighty God has estab-
lished in the moral world, and made necessary to be observed by man-
kind; in order to promote their true happiness, in their transactions and 
intercourse. These laws may be considered as principles, in respect of 
their fixedness in operation; and as maxims, since by the knowledge of 
them, we discover those rules of conduct, which direct mankind to the 
highest perfection, and supreme happiness of their nature. They are as 
fixed and unchangeable as the laws which operate in the natural 
world.187 
The problem the death of values poses for Barnett is that this real 
foundation for unchanging rights is now in question. Barnett never 
confronts this problem. Instead, he deals with it by substituting human 
consensus as the foundation for our rights in place of the unchanging 
moral architecture of the universe: 
Whatever else people may believe they have a right to, most all people 
believe that they have the right to make their own choices and act as 
they please with what belongs to them; that they can do as they will 
with what is theirs provided their actions do not harm others.188 
Barnett does not appear to see that without the foundation appealed 
to by Goodrich, which Barnett evidently believes, along with Heidegger, 
can no longer serve as the foundation of a civilization, his “rights” 
amount to nothing more than a conservative political agenda in which 
rich people would prefer not to be taxed or regulated. Worse, from 
Barnett’s perspective, his invocation of consensus brings us right back to 
 
 185.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 186.  See e.g., Elizabeth H. Wolgast, The Demands of Public Reason, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1936, 1943 (1994); David Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and 
Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877, 893 (1993). 
 187.  BARNETT, supra note 183,at 81 (emphasis provided). 
 188.  Id. at 80. 
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the majoritarianism that he originally rejects as the foundation for the 
legitimacy of government. People apparently do not believe what 
Barnett attributes to them, or they do not believe it in the same way that 
he does, or they would not have voted for the Affordable Care Act, in 
effect, twice. And it is their actual commitments, not Barnett’s verbal 
formulas, that comprise our rights under a theory of consensus. This is 
the dead end to which the death of values brings the project of 
legitimizing constitutional government. 
D. The Loss of Democracy 
Before ending this Section, I want to present one more breakdown 
brought about by the death of values—the inability of law to protect 
democracy itself. This is surprising, since democracy would seem to be 
the sort of process value I earlier suggested the Justices of the Supreme 
Court could protect despite the death of values. It turns out, however, 
that democracy is the sort of spiritual practice—in the sense of the 
German word, Geist—that requires a faith we no longer have. 
Because I am going to criticize three Republican Party legal 
strategies—the voter ID laws, the political gerrymander and the 
manipulation of the Electoral College—let me begin with a Democratic 
Party strategy that illustrates the same nihilistic worldview. In the late 
spring of 2014, Democratic Party operatives were widely reported to be 
building elaborate “get-out-the-vote” targeting strategies in states with 
close Senate election races. This strategy made perfect sense because 
one big problem for the Democratic Party is that groups that lean their 
way, such as young voters and racial minority groups, tend to sit out off-
year elections. That reduction in turnout was one reason the Democrats 
faced real problems in the fall, 2014 elections.189 
But turnout was not the only reason the Democrats were in trouble. 
President Barack Obama’s popularity ratings were low because after six 
years in office, he and his Party, in the view of many, had failed to 
deliver prosperity and a safer world. Turnout manipulation is a way to 
insulate the Party from that democratic fallout from failure. If 
Democratic Party officials really cared about democracy, they would 
have welcomed the disaster that was about to befall the Party as a 
necessary democratic correction by the people. But, of course, no 
partisan Democrat felt that way. 
 
 189.  See generally, Michael Tomasky, How Bad for Obama and the Democrats, NEW YORK 
REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 8, 2014, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/may/08/how-
bad-for-obama-and-democrats/?page=2.  
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The turnout strategy did not work. The 2014 elections were bad for 
the Democrats. But, in a closer year, the Democrats might have held off 
the democratic reckoning. The Democrats certainly were willing to try to 
do so. 
What did Heidegger mean when he told Der Spiegel in that 1966 
interview that he was not convinced that democracy could be assigned to 
this age? 
A decisive question for me today is how a political system can be as-
signed to today’s technological age at all, and which political system 
would that be? I have no answer to this question. I am not convinced 
that it is democracy.190 
I am not claiming to understand Heidegger, but his observation shines a 
light on the turnout phenomenon. The experts, who believe that they can 
and should substitute the techniques of voter turnout for the genuine 
expression of the will of the people, are already convinced that there is 
no such thing as the will of the people. There are, instead, just outcomes 
with winners and losers. We want our side to win and in a technological 
age, we develop techniques to try to accomplish that result. 
I am not suggesting that turn-out-the-vote technologies are morally 
wrong. They are beyond good and evil. Such techniques are an 
inevitable result of a time that is too technologically adept to leave the 
people to their own democratic devices. 
Now that the reader can see that I am pointing to technological 
forces rather than human evil, and that Democrats have the same 
worldview as do Republicans, let me introduce three Republican Party 
strategies that, if all were implemented fully, would destroy democracy 
in the United States. 
That sounds like a hysterical exaggeration. But it is not. 
Let me begin with voter ID laws. These are laws that require 
showing some form of government-issued voter photo ID before one can 
vote. In principle, such laws are neutral and benign—similar to the 
requirement to present a photo ID before flying. Such laws will only 
disenfranchise a small number of voters. But, almost all the voters they 
will disenfranchise vote Democratic. In a close election—and recently 
many of our elections have been close—this could make the difference. 
That is why Mike Turzai, a Republican leader in Pennsylvania chortled 
that voter ID would allow Republican Party Presidential candidate Mitt 
Romney to win Pennsylvania: 
 
 190.  Der Spiegel, supra note 47. 
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House Majority Leader Mike Turzai (R-Allegheny) suggested that the 
House’s end game in passing the Voter ID law was to benefit the GOP 
politically. 
“We are focused on making sure that we meet our obligations that 
we’ve talked about for years,” said Turzai in a speech to [Republican 
State Committee] members Saturday. He mentioned the law among a 
laundry list of accomplishments made by the GOP-run legislature. 
“Pro-Second Amendment? The Castle Doctrine, it’s done. First pro-
life legislation—abortion facility regulations—in 22 years, done. Voter 
ID, which is gonna allow Governor Romney to win the state of Penn-
sylvania, done.”191 
Since no one believes there is any sizeable amount of voter fraud going 
on that voter ID laws will end, this comment amounts to an admission of 
the intent of vote suppression. 
Then there is the political gerrymander, which Republicans have 
been astonishingly successful in implementing. In the 2012 election, the 
Republican use of the political gerrymander allowed that Party to control 
the House of Representatives against all expressions of national 
sentiment. In North Carolina, for example, Sam Wang reported in the 
New York Times that: 
[T]he two-party House vote was 51 percent Democratic, 49 percent 
Republican, the average simulated delegation was seven Democrats 
and six Republicans. The actual outcome? Four Democrats, nine Re-
publicans — a split that occurred in less than 1 percent of simulations. 
If districts were drawn fairly, this lopsided discrepancy would hardly 
ever occur.192 
Similar lopsided splits occurred in other states, like Pennsylvania. 
Finally, there is the threat of permanent minority Presidential 
elections that could easily be accomplished through manipulation of the 
Electoral College. Presidents in the United States are not elected directly 
by the people. Instead, in each state, Presidential electors are actually 
elected and each state awards its electoral votes in the manner its 
legislature chooses. 
This system is already undemocratic because of the way the number 
 
 191.  Kelly Cemetich, Turzai: Voter ID Law Means Romney Can Win Pa, POLITICS PA, June 
25, 2012, http://www.politicspa.com/turzai-voter-id-law-means-romney-can-win-pa/37153/. These 
comments were widely reported in the media and were not denied by Turzai.  
 192.  Sam Wang, The Great Gerrymander of 2012, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 2, 2013, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/the-great-gerrymander-of-
2012.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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of a state’s electoral votes is determined in the Constitution—the number 
is equal to the total congressional delegation so that smaller states have 
disproportionate weight because of their two Senators. Yet in general the 
current system works tolerably well in the sense that the Presidential 
candidate with the most votes nationally usually wins, and when that 
does not happen, as it did not most recently in 2000, the direct vote is 
usually extremely close. The American people have undoubtedly come 
to rely on these facts. 
The reason the Electoral College system usually works to elect the 
candidate with the higher number of votes nationally is that, with the 
exception of Maine and Nebraska,193 electors are elected on a winner-
take-all basis. That is, all electors pledged to the presidential candidate 
who wins the most votes in a state become electors from that state. In 
contrast, Maine and Nebraska use the congressional district method, 
selecting one elector in each congressional district by popular vote and 
selecting the remaining two electors by a statewide popular vote. 
The winner take all method has the effect of discounting the votes 
of the minority Party. So, it is predictable that the Democratic 
Presidential candidate will win California and the Republican candidate 
will win Texas before the campaign begins. But since this suppression 
happens equally in Democratic and Republican leaning states, the 
overall result nationally is usually reflective of the national vote. 
But in the last few years, Republican Party leaders have discussed a 
national strategy of converting Democratic leaning states in which 
Republicans temporarily control the state government, such as occurred 
in Pennsylvania, to the congressional district method. If this actually 
occurred in only a few Democratic leaning states, but in no Republican 
leaning ones, the result would be that the Republican candidate for 
President would usually win, even if the national vote for President 
were, for example, 51% to 49% in favor of the Democratic candidate. 
The Presidential candidate with fewer votes might even win every 
election.194 
This result would be a disaster for America—and I don’t mean 
because Republicans would be elected. It would mean the end of popular 
 
 193.  Nebraska has been considering dropping its District selection system in favor of winner-
take-all. Doug Mataconis, Nebraska To Abandon District Method for Electoral Voting Allocation?, 
OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/nebraska-to-abandon-
district-method-for-electoral-vote-allocation/. 
 194.  See Eric Black, Latest Attempt to Manipulate the Electoral College Vote is not New, 
MINNPOSt, Feb.4, 2013, http://www.minnpost.com/eric-black-ink/2013/02/latest-attempt-
manipulate-electoral-college-vote-isn-t-new. 
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government and, perhaps eventually, the takeover of a now-discredited 
political system by some form of dictatorship. Republicans who talk 
about doing this simply don’t understand the magnitude of what they are 
thinking of doing. Our political system is hanging on by a thread.195 But 
the reason this manipulation can actually be discussed is the same reason 
the Democrats are content to win by turnout technique—we no longer 
believe in something like “the will of the people.” That is the fruit of the 
death of values. 
The point for law is that the Supreme Court today lacks the 
confidence and vision to protect the people from these machinations. 
Voter ID laws should have been struck down as an interference with the 
right to vote. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court essentially did that in 
2012, remanding a voter ID law for a trial under an unattainable “no 
voter disenfranchisement” standard pursuant to the Pennsylvania 
Constitution.196 But, in contrast, the United States Supreme Court 
myopically upheld an Indiana voter ID law under the federal 
Constitution in 2008.197 Similarly, the Supreme Court has never struck 
down a political gerrymander and has so far failed to note in its opinions 
on the subject just how effective a threat to democracy this form of 
gerrymander has become.198 
In terms of the Electoral College, since the text of the Constitution 
specifically allows the manipulation that some Republicans are pushing, 
it would take an act of real judicial courage to require all states to retain 
the winner take all format because, at this point, democratic legitimacy 
requires it. It is unlikely that this nonpartisan will exists on the Supreme 
Court. 
I end this Part on this note purposely. The death of values has 
brought about the death of law as a meaningful enterprise. Under the 
reign of the death of values, there is nothing law can do. 
Finally, and not surprisingly, these breakdowns in law are reflected 
in the current downturn in law school applications. That is where this 
examination of the death of values finishes. 
 
 195.  Again, I mean this literally. It was widely rumored that the Republican controlled 
legislature in Pennsylvania would have made the switch to a congressional system but for the fact 
that an honorable man, Republican Governor Tom Corbett, opposed the change.  
 196.  Applewhite v. Com., 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012). The standard was not satisfied, and the lower 
court judge found the law to be a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution in January 2014.  
 197.  Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 198.  See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
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VIII. THE DEATH OF LAW SCHOOL AND THE DEATH OF VALUES 
The 2008 recession hit law school applications and enrollment very 
hard. In the fall of 2014, there were 37,924 full- and part-time students 
enrolled in their first year of law study, a decline of 30% from the 
beginning of the 2010-2011 school year.199 
The reason for the decline is not mysterious. The recession affected 
employment for lawyers. A year after graduation, the unemployment 
rate for the law school class of 2011 was 12% versus a one-year 
unemployment rate of 5.8% for the class of 2007.200 Potential law school 
students were wary of going into debt to go to law school when job 
prospects were uncertain. Law schools have responded by lowering the 
cost of law school, which in turn has affected the income and job 
prospects of law school faculty. 
But is unemployment the entire story of this decline? This is a 
dramatic reduction in a very short time. Would engineering or arts 
school enrollment respond in similar dramatic fashion to a downturn in 
employment? Or physics study? Perhaps part of the story of law school 
decline is that some of these potential students did not have a burning 
desire to study law or to become lawyers—that, instead, it was just a 
career option rather than a vocation. 
I have been to several conferences in recent years that have 
addressed supposed shortcomings in legal education as a way of 
addressing this new, straitened context for law schools. Advances in 
teaching and academic support have been proposed and adopted 
nationally. The American Bar Association is requiring increases in 
experiential learning, including an enhanced focus on clinical education. 
An effort is being made to render law school graduates practice ready. 
But I have not heard much, if anything, about what law school is 
supposed to be about. Yes, there are skills to be acquired, but what are 
those skills supposed to enable a legal practitioner to do? I believe part 
of the reason for law school decline is that law professors today have 
little idea of what the study of law is. And without a clear understanding 
of that, the study of law cannot excite students. 
Different answers to the question of what law study is about can be 
imagined. But all are questionable in light of the death of values. 
For example, law is always said to be about resolving disputes. 
 
 199.  Elizabeth Olson & David Segal, A Steep Slide in Law School Enrollment Accelerates, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Dec., 17, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/17/law-school-enrollment-
falls-to-lowest-level-since-1987/ (figures recently released by the ABA). 
 200.  Id. 
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Every society needs a formal mechanism to do that. That is obviously 
one purpose of a legal system, particularly with regard to disputes 
among individuals and businesses. (The American penchant for 
judicially enforceable limits on government used to be fairly unique in 
the world, but it has always been the case that societies used law for 
resolving private disputes). Could law schools then teach dispute 
resolution? 
The answer is probably not, in part because dispute resolution is not 
a brute fact. Some ways of resolving disputes are better than others, in 
the sense of reducing future disputes and reducing future tension over 
past disputes. Presumably, decisions that accord with a popular sense of 
justice and fairness resolve disputes better. So, “might makes right” 
would resolve the dispute in question but would not function well in the 
long run. 
The problem for American law, and the reason law school is not 
about resolving disputes, is that the popular sense of justice is that a just 
solution means really just and not “just as a matter of opinion.” A judge 
is not free to say in deciding a case that “most people would find for the 
plaintiff.” And it will also not be considered satisfactory for the judge to 
say that “the plaintiff wins because he will make trouble for everyone if 
he loses.” 
Therefore, the only way for a legal system to resolve disputes is to 
engage in a search for real justice. If American law finds it difficult to do 
this because of the death of values, then even this ordinary role for law 
will suffer. 
This conclusion does not necessitate that the substance of justice 
must come from a judge. A part of the conception of real justice could 
include resolving who decides what. It could be that a legislative 
decision has already been made that applies to some particular dispute. 
But it is also the case that the American Constitution has been 
interpreted consistently to place at least some decisions beyond the 
authority of legislatures and executives. So, sometimes it will have to be 
judges who decide. 
But whoever ultimately decides, that decision must include an 
element of enduring justice. We can therefore conclude that dispute 
resolution cannot forthrightly provide a role for law school unless law 
schools confront the death of values. 
If not dispute resolution, are law students learning to discern the 
law? But that would also require something of the ontology of values 
that has died. Law would have to be something to be discovered. 
There are, of course, lawyerly methods in which students in law 
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schools are inculcated. All American law schools teach students to argue 
in the interests of their clients based on supposed holdings of prior cases. 
All law students gain a sense of law as a systematic whole of at least 
somewhat interrelated parts. All law students learn to distinguish 
authoritative aspects of judicial decisions from dicta and learn to 
distinguish one case from another in its application to a current case. All 
American lawyers know how to write briefs and make arguments to 
judges based upon these techniques. These have been lawyerly skills 
since the era of the common law. At that time, these skills were thought 
of as the methods through which law was discovered. 
But even though lawyers still argue the proper interpretation of 
cases, I do not believe that law students are learning genuine common 
law thinking. Lawyers today are also very comfortable with the notion of 
“majority” and “minority” views of legal issues, with judges in different 
states taking one position or the other based on disagreements over the 
usual sorts of pragmatic considerations. And while a lawyer may view 
cases applying strict liability in tort or finding liability in a holder in due 
course, for example, as either wise or mistaken—and thus “correct” or 
not in a sense—that sense is not the same as the older view that one 
judicial approach really was the law and the other really was not the law. 
When judges decide such cases today, in the increasingly rare 
situations in which statutes do not control, they know that they are 
making choices of some kind. And, like the Justices in 1992, they try to 
avoid making value judgments when they can. Instead, they decide 
according to human norms deemed to be predetermined—whether 
maximizing utility or the gross national product or promoting procedural 
fairness. These norms are said by such judges to be embedded in 
positive legal sources. Such decisions are not exceptions to the death of 
values but the best we think we can do under it. 
Others may see common law judging differently. But even Steve 
Wise, the American lawyer who is using the common law most 
creatively today to establish legal rights for animals, admits that most 
common law judges are applying human norms when they decide cases 
rather than applying any enduring value. Wise distinguishes formal 
judges, who follow either prior case law or the legal principles that the 
cases may be said to represent, from substantive judges who apply 
contemporary public values or the community’s sense of justice, and 
distinguishes both of these from principle judges, who apply moral 
principles to cases. This latter group is a minority of judges and even 
among that minority, not all these judges are thinking in terms of 
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enduring moral principles.201 
We are in a period in which law schools teach familiar and even 
ancient techniques of legal analysis but no longer have a clear idea what 
these techniques are supposed to do. We cannot credibly teach objective 
values with universal application because of the death of values—values 
that legal methods used to be thought to reach. But then why do law 
schools still teach more or less the same way they did fifty years ago? 
This was the kind of question that the precursors of legal realism used to 
ask, who expected economics and statistics to eventually supplant 
traditional legal analysis in law school education. 
I am not sure of the answer to this question. But it may be that there 
is no legitimate reason. It is possible that law schools teach these 
traditional techniques, and lawyers utilize them, out of habit and self-
interest. 
By habit I don’t just mean that lawyers are taught the way they are 
because they have always been taught that way and therefore these 
training practices carry authority and legitimacy by virtue of their 
pedigree. There is some of that, as illustrated in the 1973 movie, The 
Paper Chase. But that world is fading—most law students today have 
never seen that movie and are not particularly romantic about these 
practices. The so-called Socratic method, with its humiliations and 
alleged insights, is not what it used to be. 
No, by habit I mean the disreputable reliance on established 
practices to avoid thinking about what judges and lawyers might actually 
be able to contribute to the welfare of society. Law professors teach 
what is called mid-level doctrinal analysis to first year law students 
because we don’t know how to teach anything else. Aside from some 
occasional experimentation with economics, and aside from the high 
profile constitutional/political controversies, we law professors have no 
idea how legal issues should be decided. It is to be assumed that judges, 
who are also products of this law school system, actually decide cases 
based not on anything they learned in law school, but based on intuitive 
judgments of various kinds or commitments from outside law. 
The habitual law school curriculum would not be of very much use 
to a judge actually trying to decide a societal issue, which is why I 
assume that good judges use the sort of pragmatic approach that Judge 
Richard Posner talks about as the proper judicial role.202 At the best and 
 
 201.  See How Common Law Judges Decide Cases, NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, 
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/how-common-law-judges-decide-cases/. 
 202.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008). 
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most innovative law schools, students might pick up a few tools of the 
social sciences, such as a little economics and statistics. But not enough 
to be of help to a judge deciding a case.203 
Certainly, law school could become the place where talented 
generalists learn all the tools we know for promoting flourishing social 
life—lawyers would then be social physicians to society—but that is in 
no sense what law school is like today. Today we still teach students to 
read cases. 
Habit thus in part represents a kind of intellectual sloth in the law 
school curriculum. But there may be another reason that law schools 
teach formal legal analysis to the practical exclusion of everything else. 
This other reason would be less benign than intellectual laziness. 
There is nothing very impressive about what lawyers actually do. 
Without the mumbo jumbo of the legal formalism that Steven Smith 
celebrates, clients in particular and society in general might figure out 
that law and lawyers are an expensive and unnecessary addition to the 
problem solving skills that ought usually to be applied to disputes 
instead of applying law. It is thus in the interest of lawyers that law 
schools teach not real analysis but a kind of Neverland analysis 
consisting of teasing out case holdings and distinguishing precedent, 
which only lawyers can do. 
Worse than that, the actual outcomes of cases might be dependent 
on ideology and political commitments that formal legal analysis has 
nothing to do with. So, law students might study cases like Citizens 
United v. FEC204 or Bush v. Gore205 or Roe v. Wade,206 but never come 
to grips with why such cases were decided the way that they were. Chief 
Justice Roberts might hold that the individual mandate in National 
Association of Independent Business v. Sebelius207 is a tax rather than a 
penalty, but a class in constitutional law would have no context in which 
to address that decision. It is perfectly obvious that the line of Eighth 
Amendment cases adverted to above had nothing really to do with 
national consensus, but was determined, rather, by the felt necessities of 
five Justices. But how is this to be taught? 
Under all these circumstances, law school feels arcane and 
 
 203.  “Lawyers eventually learn that judges are more realistic than formalistic, but they have 
not been equipped by their education to articulate and substantiate pragmatic arguments in a form 
convincing to judges.” Jonathan Maur, How Judges Think: A Conversation with Richard Posner, 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/spring08/posnerhowjudgesthink. 
 204.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 205.  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 206.  410 U.S. 113 (1972). 
 207.  132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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disconnected from social life. A student might still enroll because law is 
the only route to what seems like the levers of social power, but the 
content of law school teaching would be beside the point. Law school 
would not be the kind of attractor that science and art can be. It would 
not be clear what is being studied there. 
What can be done? It is beyond the scope of this Article to try to 
reform law school. But four tentative observations are in order. 
First, technology is not any kind of answer. Technology is a ground 
of the death of values. The Internet and its implications encourage 
shallow living.208 Even one-on-one skyping, which I engage in 
sometimes to read philosophy communally, has a very different feel 
from in-person contact. Online courses will inevitably emphasize 
information for a student over transformation of the student. 
Second, the death of values is irreversible. It is part of the dead end 
of metaphysics that Heidegger saw and announced.209 But does that 
mean that the notion and role of the rule of law must be abandoned? The 
Crits suggested that it did years ago and for their trouble they were 
invited to leave the legal academy.210 But they now have their revenge, 
when even the legal mainstream is expressly subject to the death of 
values. 
Yet, I have seen the rule of law provide what seems like a kind of 
restraint on arbitrary power. These are valuable traditions—can they still 
be relied upon in some way? Or must they be abandoned as relics of a 
dead end? 
This question should haunt law professors. The title that Heidegger 
chose for his meditation on his own failed connection to the Nazi Party, 
as well as the world’s situation in 1936-1938, as well as the question of 
being—thoughts that of necessity went into a drawer—was the banality, 
Contributions to Philosophy.211 Heidegger explained this choice as 
follows: “[A]ll essential titles have become impossible on account of the 
exhaustion of every basic word . . . .”212 What does that teach us about 
 
 208.  See NICHOLAS CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS 
(2011). 
 209.  For Heidegger, it was also called the collapse of German idealism: “[T]he age that was no 
longer strong enough to stand up to the greatness, breadth and originality of that spiritual 
world . . . .” MARTIN HEIDEGGER, INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS, 48 (Gregory Fried & Richard 
Polt trans., 2000). 
 210.  Some of the stories of discrimination against members of the Critical Legal Studies 
movement—if the term member can be forgiven—are told by Mark V. Tushnet in Critical Legal 
Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991). 
 211.  HEIDEGGER, supra note 6. 
 212.  Id. at 5. 
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our own basic words—words such as “the rule of law”? Perhaps they 
can no longer be used. 
Third, law professors must practice candor above everything else. 
In contexts in which traditional legal analysis is merely a necessary 
charade—something a lawyer would use to dress up a brief—the 
professor must admit this and attempt to give a fuller account of the 
realities of law. This will return to the law school classroom a sense of 
the real. But, will students still come to law school, and will society still 
need law schools, when we admit that our stock in trade is not relevant? 
We should have begun asking that during the era of legal realism, but we 
did not want to admit—or, we truly did not believe—the bankruptcy of 
our endeavor. Now, the foundations of law are much shakier than they 
were then. 
Finally, there is still truth. Significance still comes on the scene. 
There is still yearning for liberation and freedom. There is still injustice, 
economic and otherwise. There is deadly peril for our nation and for our 
planet. Philosophy did not end with Nietzsche. And the American people 
have not quite lost their hope for constitutional democracy. Somehow, 
we law professors have to learn a new way that reaches out toward these 
yearnings and needs—and begins to ask how to be of service. I hope to 
attempt a beginning toward a new way in the second part of this 
Article—Being in Law School. 
If we do begin to learn a new way, then law schools might not stand 
so empty. 
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